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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the exclusion effect on excluded stocks’ cost of equity 
capital. We study the effect by examining European and US tobacco stocks before and after 
2010, relative to chosen comparable companies. Our findings suggest that exclusions of 
tobacco companies can have a significant direct effect on the cost of equity. The direct effect 
can be explained by Merton’s market segmentation model, and a premium for “boycotted” 
stocks. Exclusionary investing creates a segmented market, which reduces the demand for the 
excluded stocks, causing limited risk-sharing and restricted diversification opportunities for 
investors. Thus, investors will require a risk premium for holding excluded stocks, implying a 
higher cost of equity for excluded stocks. 
Additionally, we study coal companies to examine the effects and implications of excluding 
fossil fuel companies. Our results indicate that the exclusions of coal companies have no 
significant direct effect on the cost of equity. These findings could imply that there is not a 
sufficient number of investors who have excluded coal stocks. The coal industry has been the 
primary focus for exclusions within the fossil fuel industry. Hence, the direct exclusion effect 
of oil and gas companies on their cost of equity will likely be limited. 
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1. Introduction 
The world is in need of balancing sustainable development and economic growth. In this 
context, there is a debate about what role the financial market is to play. While traditional 
investors focus on financial return only, sustainable investors incorporate sustainability into 
their investment decisions. 
In 2018, the total value of global socially responsible investing (SRI) assets was $30.7 trillion, 
an increase of $7.9 trillion since 2016 (GSIA, 2018). This increase is stimulated by investors 
who incorporate social and environmental factors into their investment process. There are 
many strategies of SRI, with exclusionary investing as the most used strategy (GSIA, 2018). 
Exclusionary investing, commonly referred to as exclusion, means that investors restrict their 
investments based on products or business practices due to ethical and financial concerns (P. 
J. Trinks & Scholtens, 2017). Tobacco is one of the most common screens due to its severe 
negative social impact. In recent years, investors have started excluding fossil fuel stocks 
because of substantial carbon emissions. Exclusionary investing might increase uncertainty 
for both the firms and the investors. Hence, it should be in their interest to be aware of the 
implications of exclusionary investing.  
This paper examines one implication of exclusionary investing; the direct effect of 
exclusionary investing on companies’ cost of equity capital.  
In our main analysis, we study the direct effect by examining tobacco companies which have 
been excluded by socially responsible investors for a long time. We use our findings to discuss 
possible implications for the excluded tobacco firms and their investors. Additionally, we 
perform an analysis of the exclusion of coal companies. We employ the results to discuss 
possible implications for fossil fuel companies, which currently experience increased pressure 
from socially responsible investors.  
In this section, we describe different approaches to SRI and different motives behind 
exclusionary investing. Further, we introduce previous research on SRI and exclusionary 
investing. Finally, we present the motivation and purpose of our study. 
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1.1 Approaches to Socially Responsible Investing 
Socially responsible investing is a growing market in which investors incorporate 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into their investment decisions (GSIA, 
2018). 
There are seven main strategies of sustainable investing, as published in the Global Investment 
Review 2012 (GSIA, 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Strategies of SRI, adopted from the Global Investment Review 
2012 (GSIA, 2012)   
Europe and the United States have the highest proportion of the globally sustainable and 
responsibly managed assets, with proportions of 46% and 39%, respectively (GSIA, 2018). 
The most mature SRI market is currently in Europe. Exclusionary investing is the top strategy, 
with tobacco, controversial weapons, and other weapons as the most common screens. The 
US market is growing at a steady pace, with ESG integration and exclusionary investing being 
the leading investing strategies. Tobacco-related products are one of the top screens in the US, 
adding up to $2.9 trillion in assets. Globally, exclusionary investing is the most extensive 
strategy of SRI, with a total of $19.8 trillion in assets (GSIA, 2018). Figure 2 shows the asset 
values of the different strategies in 2018. 
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Figure 2: Sustainable investing assets by strategy and region, published in 
the Global Investment Review 2018 (GSIA, 2018) 
Characteristics of Exclusionary Investing 
In this paper, we study the effects of exclusionary investing. Langbein and Posner (1980) 
define socially exclusionary investing as “excluding the securities of otherwise attractive 
companies from an investor’s portfolio because the companies are judged to be socially 
irresponsible, and including the securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because 
they are judged to be behaving in a socially laudable way”.  
Restricted investment opportunities can be costly for investors (e.g. Geczy, Stambaugh, and 
Levin (2005)), e.g. due to decreased diversification and increased exposure towards systematic 
risk factors. Following Markowitz (1952) portfolio theory, exclusionary investing can never 
be financially beneficial as the investment restriction leads to a lower efficient frontier. 
However, exclusionary investing might have benefits such as the reduced exposure towards 
possible stranded assets (in the long term) and the possibility of avoiding reputational risk 
(Schoenmaker & Schramade, 2018).1 
Non-financial and financial reasons can explain the motives of applying exclusionary 
investing. In our view, there are three main reasons. 
1) The investor wants to have “green” hands, either induced by social norms or own 
values and beliefs (Fama & French, 2007) 
 
1 Stranded assets are defined as “assets that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-downs, downward revaluations or 
are converted to liabilities” (Ansar, Caldecott, & Tilbury, 2013). 
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2) By excluding the firm, the investor aims to push the firm into becoming more 
socially responsible by increasing the firm’s cost of capital (Heinkel, Kraus, & 
Zechner, 2001) 
3) The investor believes that the excluded firm generates a lower average return in the 
long term, and finds other firms more attractive (however, the excluded firm might 
generate more return in the short term) 
 
Figure 3: Motives of exclusionary investing 
In this paper, we are interested in the effect of exclusion on companies’ cost of equity, 
regardless of the motives of  exclusion.2 Due to this, the motives can be both non-financial 
and financial.  
1.2 Previous Research 
There are many studies conducted on the effects of SRI on investor performance. In total, 88% 
of the studies performed on the issues have found neutral or mixed results (Fulton, Kahn, & 
Sharples, 2012). Bello (2005) and other studies (e.g. Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993); 
Statman (2000)) find that socially responsible mutual funds do not differ significantly from 
conventional funds in terms of portfolio diversification and risk-adjusted investment 
performance. In contrast, Geczy et al. (2005) find that SRI can affect portfolio performance if 
allowing investors to believe in a substantial amount of fund-manager skills.  
The effect of exclusionary investing on the investment universe depends on the number of 
stocks excluded and the respective market value of the applied screens (P. J. Trinks & 
Scholtens, 2017). P. J. Trinks and Scholtens (2017) find that the negative screening of 
 
2 If the investor believes the excluded firm will underperform compared to the alternative firm, Adler and Kritzman (2008) 
argue that it cannot be defined as exclusionary investing, but rather an active management strategy pursuing the highest return. 
Non-financial reasons Financial reasons
The investor wants to have “green” 
hands, either induced by social norms 
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By excluding the firm, the investor 
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increasing the firm’s cost of capital
The investor believes that the excluded 
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industries such as alcohol and nuclear power will have a more substantial impact on the market 
compared to screens on industries with lower market capitalization (e.g. adult entertainment 
and fur). They explain this by higher diversification costs, the greater the market capitalization 
of the excluded companies. Previous studies have found limited effects of exclusionary 
investing. For example, Skancke (2016) finds that the initial effects of exclusion and 
divestments are limited. Diltz (1995) also finds that ethical screening has little effect on 
portfolio performance. However, in the longer term, exclusionary investing could have an 
effect by increasing the norm for acceptable standards (Schoenmaker & Schramade, 2018). 
Further, there are numerous studies on the performance of “sin stocks”.3 Studies such as Lobe 
and Walkshäusl (2016) find no significant difference in returns between “sin” portfolios and 
market benchmarks. In contrast, a majority of studies have found that “sin stocks” outperform 
their comparable stocks. For example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that the “sin stocks”; 
alcohol, tobacco, and gaming, outperform its comparable stocks. Additionally, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra (2011) examine the effect on the cost of equity by a firm’s 
presence in a “sin” industry. The study finds that investors require a premium for investing in 
“sin stocks”, i.e. that the cost of equity increases.  
Previous literature on the exclusion of fossil-fuel stocks 
While there is evidence that “sin” industries such as alcohol and tobacco significantly 
outperform the market (e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)), the fossil fuel industry shows no 
signs of such impact from exclusionary investing (A. Trinks, Scholtens, Mulder, & Dam, 
2018). A. Trinks et al. (2018) study fossil-fuel portfolios against fossil-free portfolios, aiming 
to test the effect of exclusion on abnormal risk-adjusted return. They state that excluding 
fossil-fuel stocks from the investable universe could reduce diversification opportunities for 
the investors and impose a financial cost in terms of foregone returns (following Markowitz 
(1952) portfolio theory). However, the study finds that the diversification opportunities from 
excluding fossil fuels do not seem significantly reduced.  
 
3 “Sin stocks” refer to stocks that are involved in controversial activities (Luo & Balvers, 2017). 
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1.3 Motivation and Purpose  
The increasing volume of sustainable investing challenges the traditional ways of investing. 
While “finance-as-usual” aims to create value through maximizing shareholder wealth, 
sustainable investors aim to create value by optimizing the social and environmental impact 
with subject to financial factors (Schoenmaker & Schramade, 2018). 
As mentioned, there is controversy regarding the effects of SRI and the approach of 
exclusionary investing. Previous studies find that the effect of exclusionary investing on an 
investor’s portfolio performance is limited (e.g. Skancke (2016)). However, Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) find evidence that screened “sin stocks”4 as a result of social norms yield 
higher returns than comparable stocks.  
Portfolio theory can explain the evidence of the higher return of screened stocks. Exclusionary 
investing causes investors to become less homogenous, as some investors restrict their 
investments. According to Modern Portfolio Theory, a restricted portfolio will lead to a less 
efficient portfolio (Markowitz, 1952). Exclusionary investing cannot be financially beneficial 
since investors face limited investment opportunities, leading to increased idiosyncratic risk. 
Thus, the excluded firms have to offer higher returns, i.e. a higher cost of equity, to attract a 
sufficient number of investors. Therefore, systematically screened firms can exhibit a higher 
cost of equity capital compared to firms not screened. Consequently, exclusionary investing 
affects both companies and investors.  
We contribute to the research on exclusionary investing by examining the cost of equity of the 
excluded firms. To examine the effect on the cost of equity, we study the exclusion of tobacco 
firms. The tobacco industry has been subject to negative social norms for the last four decades, 
and socially responsible investors have avoided the industry for a long time (Hong & 
Kacperczyk, 2009). 
 
4 “Sin stocks” are associated with a bad reputation and are avoided by investors due to social norms, own beliefs and litigation 
risk (Kim, An, & Kim, 2015) 
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In contrast to tobacco firms, the trend of excluding fossil fuels has emerged in recent years. 
The exclusion trend started with the Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign at US universities in 
2011. The coal industry is the most polluting fossil fuel (Cadan, 2019).  
The purpose of this study is to provide research on how exclusion can affect a company’s cost 
of equity. We examine the effect on firm-level and not on investors’ portfolio performance by 
investigating tobacco exclusions. Additionally, we study coal exclusions and use these results 
combined with our tobacco analysis to discuss possible implications for fossil fuel companies. 
Hence, we contribute to the literature on exclusionary investing. 
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2. Theoretical Frameworks and Research 
Questions 
In this section, we present the direct and indirect effects of exclusion on a firm’s cost of 
equity. Further, we present relevant theories that provide context for our analysis. Based on 
these theories and previous research, we state our research questions along with the hypothesis 
for the study on tobacco firms. 
2.1 Direct and Indirect Effect of Exclusion 
Exclusionary investing can influence a firm’s cost of equity capital through two effects; the 
direct effect and the indirect effect. When examining the direct effect, we refer to the financial 
effect of investors excluding a stock. The direct effect emerges from investors moving or 
restricting their capital from socially irresponsible firms. In theory, this restriction creates a 
segmented market with two type of investors; those who are restricted and those who are not. 
A segmented market leads to limited risk-sharing, which further affects the cost of equity.  
Further, exclusion can have an indirect effect on a firm’s cost of equity capital. Exclusion 
strategies might lead to changes in social norms (Ansar et al., 2013), which can affect the 
perceived riskiness of the firm e.g. due to pressure towards new legislations or regulations. 
Also, these changes in social norms might pressure excluded firms into transforming their 
operations, causing a different business risk.  
This paper studies the direct effect of exclusion. In the following sections, we present relevant 
theories used to examine the direct effect of exclusion. To examine how a firm’s cost of equity 
is affected by exclusionary investing, we need to understand how investors make their 
investment decisions. Hence, we present the relevant cost of equity and portfolio theory.  
2.2 Relevant Theories 
2.2.1 Cost of equity 
A firm’s cost of equity is the expected rate of return demanded by the equity holders. The 
higher the rate of return, the more expensive it is for the firm to finance its business. Further, 
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the cost of equity is reflected in the firm’s stock price, which implies what the investor is 
willing to pay for the firm’s expected cash flow, given the expected rate of return.  
There are several asset-pricing models used to estimate the cost of equity. Basic finance theory 
states that higher risk is compensated with higher returns (Markowitz, 1952). Thus, valuable 
insight in all models is that a firm’s exposure to underlying systematic risk factors determines 
the returns.  
One of the best know asset-pricing models is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
(Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). Assuming the CAPM is true, a firm’s cost of equity is estimated 
as:  
Equation 1: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
re=rf  +  𝜷(rm − rf) 
re = return on equity for equity holders, i.e. the firm’s cost of equity  
rF = risk-free rate, usually estimated as the 10-year Treasury bond  
rM = return on the market portfolio  
 = the firm’s systematic risk, calculated as covariance of the stock’s return with the return 
of the market, divided by the market variance 
According to CAPM, the return on equity is determined only by the firm’s systematic risk, 
expressed by beta. Beta represents the firm’s exposure to the market. Therefore, a reduced 
beta can lower the cost of equity, e.g. through decreasing the variability of the firm’s 
performance against the market. The firm’s unsystematic risks are assumed to be eliminated 
through diversification. 
In the real world, there is evidence suggesting that other risk factors unique to a company or 
industry also determine a firm’s cost of equity (Fama & French, 2007; Merton, 1987). 
Therefore, other asset-pricing models (e.g. Fama French Three-Factor model) incorporate 
other systematic risk factors into the model, such as a size and growth factor.  
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2.2.2 Portfolio theory 
A standard assumption in finance theory is that investors only have one objective, which is to 
maximize future expected wealth (Markowitz, 1952). The portfolio theory, based on 
Markowitz (1952), assumes homogenous investors with mean-variance preferences. When 
constructing a portfolio following Markowitz (1952), investors aim to diversify their portfolio 
by holding the market, which is the value-weighted portfolio of all available stocks. Hence, in 
theory, both “green” investors and “neutral” investors should hold the market portfolio if they 
want to maximize their portfolio, given their risk preferences.5 
Exclusionary investing causes investors to become less homogenous, as some investors restrict 
their investments. Based on the portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952), exclusionary investing 
cannot be financially beneficial since it lowers the investor’s efficient frontier. Hence, 
exclusion can increase risk and reduce return, harming the exclusionary investors. However, 
some investors are not only concerned with financial return (Schoenmaker & Schramade, 
2018). Therefore, other factors, such as socially responsible investing, can affect investor 
behavior (Geczy et al., 2005).  
Exclusionary investing results in demand differences for the excluded and the non-excluded 
firms, leading to excess demand for the non-excluded firms (Dam & Scholtens, 2015; Fama 
& French, 2007; Heinkel, Kraus, & Zechner, 2001). In contrast, there will be a shortage of 
demand for the excluded stocks, implying underpriced stocks and limited risk-sharing 
opportunities for the “neutral” investors who holds these stocks (Merton, 1987). Consequently, 
“neutral” investors will require a return premium on the excluded stocks, i.e. higher cost of 
equity.  
Firms that face reduced demand due to exclusionary investing have to offer higher returns, a 
stock premium. There are different interpretations of this risk premium. In the following, we 
present the market segmentation model (Merton, 1987) and a model for the “boycott premium” 
(Luo & Balvers, 2017).  
 
5 “Green” investors refer to investors who perform exclusionary investing. “Neutral” investors refer to those who do not 
perform exclusionary investing. 
 18
2.2.3 Market segmentation theory and HKZ model  
A market with two types of investors (“green” and “neutral”) creates a segmented market. 
Merton (1987) argues that a segmented market will affect stock prices. First, a segmented 
market causes increased idiosyncratic risk due to limited diversification opportunities and 
limited risk-sharing, which in turn increases expected returns. Second, due to limited risk-
sharing, Merton argues that CAPM no longer holds, as idiosyncratic risks in addition to beta 
matter for pricing.  
Building on Merton’s (1987) market segmentation theory, Heinkel et al. (2001) develop an 
equilibrium model to study the effect of the exclusion of polluting firms induced by social 
norms and ethical investing. The model can be applied to examine the exclusion effect on a 
firm’s stock price and cost of equity, as well as the firm’s corporate behavior. The model 
assumes;  
- Two types of investors; “neutral” investors and “green” investors  
- That firms act to maximize share price  
- A finite number of firms, each having one production technology (“clean” or 
“polluting”) 
- A constant number of investors  
- Three types of firms: acceptable, unacceptable, and reformed  
 
The “green” investors will only invest in acceptable firms, i.e. those firms that meet their 
ethical criteria. The “neutral” investors will invest in all investment opportunities, including 
both acceptable and unacceptable firms. The reformed firms are former unacceptable firms 
that have paid a fixed cost to transform into an acceptable firm.   
If a significant amount of the investor base restricts its investments in unacceptable firms, the 
“neutral” investors have to increase their ownership share in those firms, given a constant level 
of outstanding equity capital. According to Markowitz (1952) portfolio theory, “neutral” 
investors will thus own more than the optimally diversified portfolio. Consequently, a rational 
investor will require a return premium for increased idiosyncratic risk.  
Heinkel et al. (2001) argue that when the difference in return between an acceptable firm and 
an unacceptable firm is significant, paying a fixed cost to reform into an acceptable firm will 
be optimal for the unacceptable firms. The fixed costs vary depending on the firm and industry. 
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According to the model, 25% of the investor base must be “green” to induce unacceptable 
firms to reform. The fixed cost will then be lower than the alternative cost of a restricted 
investor base. However, only 10% of the investor base needs to be “green” to raise the cost of 
equity capital for unacceptable firms. Hence, exclusionary investing can affect corporate 
behavior.  
Rivoli: Relationship between cost of equity and Green investors 
Angel and Rivoli (1997) follow Merton’s (1987) market segmentation model and study 
whether ethical investing impose a cost upon the firm.  
Equation 2: Angel and Rivoli (1997) model 
𝝀𝒌 =  
𝟏 − 𝒒𝒌
𝒒𝒌
∗ 𝒙𝒌 ∗ 𝜹𝝈
𝟐
𝒌 
Their model specifies a relationship between the cost of equity and the proportion of “green” 
investors. They argue that the change in the cost of equity (λ) increases as the fraction of 
available investors fall (qk) (i.e. the fraction of “green” investors increase). Further, the cost 
of equity will increase the larger the weight of the firm in the market portfolio (xk), when the 
investors’ risk aversion (δ) is high, and when the variance of the firm’s return due to firm-
specific factors (σ) increase.  
2.2.4 The boycott premium 
In an “excluded world”, “green” investors and “neutral” investors have different preferences 
and unequal investment opportunities. Thus, they will diversify their portfolios by holding 
different risky portfolios (Fama & French, 2007). This world consists of a restrictive portfolio 
and an unrestrictive portfolio. The unrestrictive portfolio holds all stocks available in the 
investment universe, whereas the restrictive portfolio does not include the excluded stocks 
(Luo & Balvers, 2017). Thus, the efficient frontier of the restricted portfolio lies inside the 
efficient frontier of the unrestricted portfolio. Hence, the mean return is higher for the 
unrestricted portfolio, since it includes the return of both excluded and non-excluded stocks. 
The return premium of the unrestricted portfolio compared to the restricted portfolio is called 
the “boycott premium”.  
The “boycott premium” can be interpreted as a systematic risk factor, in which the exposure 
to the risk factor determines the return. Hence, the standard CAPM no longer holds. In market 
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equilibrium, the mean return of all stocks, both excluded and non-excluded, positively 
correlated with the excluded stocks will be affected. The change depends on the extent of 
correlated stocks in the market and whether the stock is excluded or not.  
Further, since “neutral” investors hold all excluded stocks in an “excluded world”, the 
portfolio will be unbalanced with regards to diversification (Luo & Balvers, 2017). 
Consequently, “neutral” investors will require a premium for holding a surplus of the excluded 
stocks. Also, “neutral” investors will move their capital away from non-excluded stocks that 
correlate with the excluded stocks. Similarly, “green” investors seek to diversify their portfolio 
by buying more non-excluded stocks that correlate with the stocks they have excluded.  
Lastly, stocks that have a low correlation to the market have a higher demand than high-
correlation stocks due to diversification. Consequently, the exclusion of stocks with low 
correlation to the market is associated with the highest diversification costs for “green” 
investors. 
2.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
We study tobacco firms and examine the direct effect of exclusion, i.e. that the cost of equity 
changes due to a constrained investor base, limited diversification opportunities, or reduced 
demand for the stock. To find the direct effect, we have to isolate the indirect effect by 
controlling for legal, regulatory and reputational risks that change across time, or assume that 
these risks remain unchanged in the period of interest. 
The tobacco industry has faced negative social norms for the last four decades. The tobacco 
industry is estimated to cause five times more costs than benefits for society (Deutsche Asset 
Management, 2017). Therefore, the industry has been avoided by socially responsible 
investors for a long time (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Several regulations have been imposed 
on the tobacco industry, which potentially could hurt the tobacco firms’ reputation and lower 
their revenues.6 However, there are fewer regulations in emerging markets, which make up 
80% of the tobacco demand. This might mitigate the effect of regulations imposed in 
 
6 According to WHO, only a 10% share of tobacco taxes is sufficient in reducing the demand for cigarettes (Deutsche Asset 
Management, 2017). 
 21 
developed markets, which can be seen by the companies’ steady cash flows and revenues 
(Ansar et al., 2013). Further, tobacco firms have limited opportunities to change their business 
without removing their tobacco production (Skancke et al., 2014).7 Based on this, we argue 
that the indirect effect on the tobacco firms’ cost of equity is limited. Hence, the tobacco 
industry is appropriate for isolating the indirect effect, which is necessary to examine the direct 
effect only.8  
Our paper attempts to answer the following research question: 
What is the direct effect of exclusionary investing strategies on tobacco firms’ cost of 
equity capital? 
Our hypothesis is: 
The direct effect of exclusion has a significant impact on a tobacco firm’s cost of equity capital. 
Following Heinkel et al. (2001), we believe this will be true if there is a sufficient number of 
investors who exclude the company.  
Supplementary research question 
Additionally to tobacco companies, we analyze the exclusion of coal companies to discuss the 
implications of excluding fossil fuels, leading to the following supplementary research 
question: 
Will exclusionary investing have a significant direct effect on the cost of equity for fossil 
fuel firms?  
 
7 Heinkel et al. (2001) state that if a sufficient number of investors exclude tobacco firms, the firms might want to change 
their business to become “acceptable” for socially responsible investors. However, tobacco firms have limited opportunities 
to change their business without removing their tobacco production (Skancke et al., 2014). This further supports our 
assumption that there are limited indirect effects from excluding tobacco.    
8 Other “sin” industries not analyzed are discussed in Appendix 10.8. 
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3. Empirical Methodology 
This section presents the econometric model used to determine the direct effect of the 
exclusion of tobacco firms on the cost of equity capital. The specified model in this study 
exploits the benefits of the panel data by using a difference-in-difference estimation with a 
fixed effects model. The model estimates the causal effect of exclusion by controlling for firm- 
and country-specific factors. Due to the assumption that tobacco companies are not able 
to reform, the estimation measures the direct effect of exclusion, i.e. the effect of investors 
selling the stock. Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we employ a research design in 
which we compare tobacco stocks relative to stocks with comparable characteristics. This 
design enables us to separate other factors relating to the industry or the market, such that we 
capture the direct effect of exclusion. 
3.1 Panel Study  
This study examines tobacco companies along with comparable companies over the period 
ranging from 2000 until 2018.9 Since the data consists of both cross-sectional and time-series 
data with several panel members not observed in every period, it is an unbalanced panel study 
(Wooldridge, 2012). Equation 3 presents a typical linear regression of panel data.  
Equation 3: Panel data model 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷 ∗ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒂𝒊 + 𝜹𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 
In Equation 3, y denotes the dependent variable and X the independent variable in which these 
variables vary over time t and between firms i (Wooldridge, 2016). ß explains the change in 
yit due to a one-unit change in Xit. The three remaining terms represent the error (the 
unobserved effects). The variable ai captures unobserved, time-constant cross-sectional factors 
that affect yit (Wooldridge, 2016). Since i denotes firms in this analysis, ai is a firm fixed effect 
(such as firm strategy, culture, and employee ability). 𝛿t represents a time-varying term which 
is constant across units (such as economic cycles). The term uit is a time-varying error, referred 
to as idiosyncratic error.  
 
9 The chosen time-period is explained in the Data Section. 
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Panel data differs from an independently pooled cross-section and has several advantages, 
such as a higher number of observations and greater precision. However, for econometric 
analysis, the assumption of independently distributed observations across time does not longer 
hold (Wooldridge, 2016). Thus, special models are used to analyze these types of data.   
The most used and simple model for analyzing panel data is pooled OLS (Wooldridge, 2016). 
The model ignores the time-invariant and individual-specific specific effects as well as the 
time-specific and individual-invariant effects. Thus, the model collects all observations in a 
“pool” as a big cross-section. In order for the model to provide a causal relationship between 
X and y, one must assume that the unobserved effects ai and 𝛿t is uncorrelated with Xit, 
otherwise, the model would give heterogeneity bias (e.g. omitted variable bias) (Wooldridge, 
2016). 
A major advantage of collecting panel data is to control for time-constant and individual-
specific unobserved factors (ai) as well as time-varying and individual-constant unobserved 
factors (𝛿t), which may be correlated with the independent variables in the 
model  (Wooldridge, 2016). Individual-constant factors are features that are constant across 
time but vary between individuals (e.g. managerial skills for firms). Time-specific factors are 
factors that vary over time but are constant between individuals (e.g. the financial crisis). Such 
unobserved constant factors, also called unobserved fixed effects, might be correlated with the 
explanatory variables, violating the assumptions for pooled OLS and causing heterogeneity 
when not being included in the model. Unobserved heterogeneity will likely not lead to a 
successful model. One solution is to add more control variables, but it may be challenging to 
determine which variables to add and how to add them. The issue can be removed by using a 
fixed effects estimation, which treats the unobserved factors as constants over 
time  (Wooldridge, 2016). By doing so, one must only assume that the time-variant error term 
uit is uncorrelated with Xit in all time-periods. 
The framework for the fixed effects model is described further throughout this section.  
3.1.1 Fixed effects estimation 
A fixed effects transformation is a model that can remove the unobserved individual-fixed 
effects, ai (Wooldridge, 2016). By assuming that ai is constant over time, the unobserved fixed 
effects can disappear by time-demeaning the data on y. Consider the equation for panel data 
below.  
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(1) 𝒚𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒂𝒊 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕  
Then, one must take the average for each i over time: 
(2) ?̅?𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟏 ∗ ?̅?𝒊 + 𝒂𝒊 + ?̅?𝒊𝒕 
The fixed effects model then subtracts equation 1 from equation 2: 
(3) 𝒚𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟏(𝑿𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊) + (𝒂𝒊 − 𝒂𝒊) + (𝒖𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊) 
Which can be written as: 
(4) ?̈?𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟏?̈?𝒊𝒕 + ?̈?𝒊𝒕 
The fixed effects transformation has now removed the within-unit but time-invariant 
variations for both outcome and treatment variables (Imai & Kim, 2018). Hence, the term ai 
has disappeared, meaning that the unobserved time-constant effects on the dependent variable 
can be correlated with the explanatory variables in any time-period. However, it is assumed 
that the unobserved time-invariant term 𝑢it is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in 
all time-periods. To remove the within-time but unit-invariant variations, time dummies can 
be included for all years minus one (e.g. to account for macro factors). The equation can then 
be estimated using pooled OLS (Wooldridge, 2016).10 
Another way to obtain the fixed effects model is to include individual dummy variables for 
each cross-sectional observation, such that the unobserved effect is added explicitly in the 
model and treated as the coefficient of the individual-specific dummy variable (Dougherty, 
2011). This method is known as the least squares dummy variable regression model (LSDV) 
and can be applied easily to software programs.11  
3.1.2 Difference-in-differences estimation 
Our study could be designed as a quasi-experiment, meaning that an exogenous event leads to 
a change in the environment in which the individuals operate (Wooldridge, 2016). A quasi-
experiment design is based on two time periods and two groups; one treatment group affected 
by a treatment and one control group not affected. In the first period, no group is treated, and 
 
10 The OLS assumptions are explained in Appendix 10.2. 
11 We use the LSDV approach in our estimations and apply the method in R. 
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in the second period, the treatment group is affected by the treatment, whereas the control 
group is not (Wooldridge, 2016).  
In a “true” experiment, the treatment applies to individuals that are randomly selected from a 
group of individuals with similar characteristics. A potential change after the treatment can 
then be explained by the treatment itself and not other factors that differ between the groups. 
However, when the treatment is not randomly assigned but applied to chosen individuals, the 
design may suffer from selection bias in which can affect the validity of the results.  
The Difference-in-Difference (DiD) design overcomes this potential selection bias as long as 
the parallel trends assumption holds (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Imai & Kim, 2018). The 
parallel trends assumption means that in the absence of the treatment, the difference between 
the groups (treatment and control) is constant over time (Callaway & Sant'Anna, 2018). The 
two groups do not have to be identical, as long as the fixed effects or other control variables 
capture the difference between them (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). Further, the treatment might 
cause a deviation from the common trends, making it possible to examine the effect of the 
treatment. This assumption must hold to get unbiased results. Therefore, the control group 
must be carefully chosen. 
Further, the DiD estimator requires the absence of causal relationships between past outcomes 
and current treatment (Imai & Kim, 2018) and that the treatment is irreversible, i.e. that the 
treatment group cannot avoid treatment once it has occurred (Callaway & Sant'Anna, 2018). 
The difference-in-difference estimator: 
𝜷 =  (?̅? 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕, 𝑻 − ?̅? 𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕, 𝑪) − (?̅? 𝑷𝒓𝒆, 𝑻 − ?̅? 𝑷𝒓𝒆, 𝑪), in which Post = post-treatment, Pre 
= pre-treatment, T = treatment group, C = control group 
The difference between the average change in y between the two groups is presented by 𝛽. 
This transformation allows the two groups to be comparable since the groups have parallel 
trends. The difference-in-difference design therefore analyzes the change in y for the treatment 
group before and after the treatment, relative to the corresponding change of y for the control 
group.  
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3.2 Model Specification 
The specified model in this study exploits the benefits of the panel data by using a difference-
in-difference estimation with a fixed effects model. In this model, the treatment is the 
exclusion of tobacco companies, and the dependent variable is the cost of equity (COE). To 
estimate a causal relationship between the cost of equity and exclusion, we add comparable 
companies to the model. These comparable companies have not been affected by exclusion, 
i.e. they are used as a control group. This research design allows for a comparison of the 
difference between the actual change in COE of tobacco companies relative to what the change 
would have been without exclusion.   
The measure of the exclusion is based on an interaction term between a dummy variable 
indicating whether the period is post-exclusion (i.e. post-treatment) and a dummy variable of 
whether a firm is tobacco or not (i.e. treatment or control group). In this design, the groups are 
nonequivalent, meaning that the firms are not randomly assigned and that there are important 
differences between the two groups of industries.  
The following model assumes that the exclusion of tobacco companies occurs at the same time 
and that no comparable company is excluded. Further, the model assumes that no tobacco 
company can avoid exclusion once the exclusion has happened.  
Equation 4: Main Model Specification 
𝑪𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 ∗ (𝑨𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒍𝒕  ∗ 𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒐𝒊) + 𝜷𝟐 ∗
𝑿𝒊𝒕 +∑ 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 (𝒂𝒊) + ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒇𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔 (𝜹𝒕) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 
AfterExcl is a dummy variable scored 1 if the year is after the exclusion period, 0 otherwise. 
Tobacco is a dummy variable scored 1 if the firm-year observations belong to the industry 
Tobacco, 0 otherwise. AfterExcl * Tobacco is the interaction term between the two dummies. 
COE is regressed on the interaction variable along with other control variables (Xit) and firm 
(ai) and year (𝛿t) fixed effects. These fixed effects capture those unobserved fixed factors that 
are constant over time for each firm and those that are constant across each firm but differs 
over time. The control variables, Xit, are explained further in Section 4. 
The coefficient of interest in our model is β1 and is called the difference-in-difference 
estimator (often called the average treatment effect) (Wooldridge, 2016). This coefficient 
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captures the average exclusion effect on COE, meaning the change in COE of tobacco firms 
after being excluded, relative to the change of comparable companies.  
Equation 5: The difference-in-difference estimator 
𝜷𝟏 = (𝑪𝑶𝑬̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕, 𝑻 − 𝑪𝑶𝑬̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕, 𝑪) − (𝑪𝑶𝑬̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑷𝒓𝒆, 𝑻 − 𝑪𝑶𝑬̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑷𝒓𝒆, 𝑪), in which Post = 
post-exclusion, pre = pre-exclusion, T = tobacco companies, C = comparable companies 
As this model presents two dimensions, one across time and one across space, spatial 
correlation may occur (Pesaran & Tosetti, 2011). Spatial correlation is an extension of time 
serial correlation, also including cross-sectional dependence. This may be the case e.g. with 
regulations targeting one of the industries, firms, or countries in a specific time-period. With 
such spatial correlation occurring in the unobserved factors, the standard errors of the error 
term may be too small. Therefore, the variance of the sample should be estimated by a two-
way clustering of standard errors ((e.g., Arellano (1987) and Cameron and Miller (2015)). 
Here the Newey and West 1987 corrected standard errors are used, which also correct for 
heteroscedasticity (Hail & Leuz, 2006). The clustering is done by firm and year to account for 
standard errors correlated across time but not within units (following Hail and Leuz (2009)).  
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4. Data 
In the following section, we detail how we select and gather the data used to examine the direct 
effect of the exclusions of tobacco firms on the cost of equity. First, we describe the 
identification of tobacco firms and its chosen comparable companies. Second, we present the 
choice of countries and the selected exclusion period of tobacco firms. Further, we present the 
different data sources and the selected variables for our model. Lastly, we summarize the 
gathered data. 
4.1 Sample Selection 
4.1.1 Identifying companies 
When examining the hypothesis of this study, the value and validity of the results rely upon 
the task of selecting and classifying the right companies. Therefore, gathering the correct data 
is crucial for the results to be interpretable. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and El Ghoul et al. 
(2011) base their “sin stock” classifications on the 48 industry codes defined by Fama and 
French (1997). They use Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes combined with the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes to determine the classified 
“sin stocks”. Other studies such as Kim et al. (2015) have specific criteria for each firm and 
screen each firm, while P. J. Trinks and Scholtens (2017) use both SIC-codes and an industry 
list already defined; the list CU 200.  
The main advantage of using SIC-codes and the NAICS classification is the reduced burden 
of screening each company to make the industry classification, i.e. it is less time demanding. 
However, some complex companies may be classified by only one part of their business. In 
such cases, SIC-codes and the NAICS classification may fail to capture the industry effect of 
the company.  
We use industry SIC-codes and NBIM’s exclusion criteria as a starting point for selecting 
companies. Further, we screen the companies of interest according to the data requirements, 
described in Section 4.2. 
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4.1.2 Selection of tobacco firms 
The companies classified as tobacco companies in this study are involved in direct and/or 
indirect production (e.g. production of filters or papers) of tobacco. We include tobacco 
companies regardless of their percentage of business involved in tobacco production, 
following NBIM’s exclusion of tobacco companies (Finance, 2010).  
The tobacco industry has a unique SIC-code classification (21-). Thus, many of the tobacco 
companies in this sample are classified by this code. Also, our sample consists of tobacco 
companies with different SIC-codes. We include these companies due to their tobacco-related 
activities and revenues. 
4.1.3 Selection of comparables 
Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), the research design of this study is based on 
identifying the exclusion effect on cost of equity of tobacco companies relative to carefully 
chosen industry comparable companies. By using comparables, we control for unobserved 
factors related to industry or market characteristics, such that the change in the cost of equity 
is coming from exclusion only.  
One way to select comparable companies is to examine companies with similar SIC-codes as 
the companies of interest. However, the tobacco industry has a unique SIC-code. Therefore, 
this study follows Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and selects food producers as the comparable 
companies. Food companies are applicable due to consumer preferences, i.e. that tobacco is 
often lumped together with food. Also, tobacco stocks are similar to value firms, such as food 
producers, in terms of their firm characteristics. This can be seen from the firms’ steady cash 
flows, the low market to book ratios, and the low betas. Assuming food producers are not 
excluded, we can study the effect of exclusion by comparing the COE development of tobacco 
firms with the COE development of food producers.  
The food producers all have SIC-codes of 20-, which classify manufacturing companies. The 
chosen food companies are selected based on Thompson Datastream’s Food Producers index.  
4.1.4 Choice of countries 
When studying the effects of SRI and the strategy of negative screening, previous research 
show that there are differences across countries, culture, time-periods, and investor 
 30
characteristics (Durand, Koh, & Tan, 2013; Kumar, Page, & Spalt, 2011; Scholtens & 
Sievänen, 2013). Therefore, this paper focuses on countries that have similar SRI trends across 
investors. In doing so, we can assume that the tobacco companies have similar exclusion 
trends. Thus, the companies chosen for this study are required to have origins from Europe, 
Canada, or the US since tobacco exclusion in these countries has been deeply rooted in 
investor and consumer preferences. Further, these countries are developed and thus have 
similar market trends. Choosing these geographical areas will mitigate differences across 
countries. 
The left column of Table 1 presents an overview of the total number of global tobacco firms. 
These firms all have SIC codes of 21-. We screen all tobacco firms according to the 
requirements explained in Section 4.2. None of the companies from Canada fulfill all 
requirements. Therefore, we only include companies from the US and Europe. The right 
column presents the included companies.  
Table 1: Selected tobacco firms 
 
4.1.5 The tobacco exclusion period 
Socially responsible investors have avoided tobacco stocks for a long time (Hong & 
Kacperczyk, 2009). In 1994, the tobacco divestment campaign started, aiming to motivate 
Country Tobacco firms Selected tobacco firms
Bulgaria 7 1
Canada 5 0
China 1 0
Croatia 1 1
Czech Republic 1 0
Denmark 1 1
Egypt 1 0
Greece 1 1
Hong Kong 1 0
India 9 0
Indonesia 5 0
Other 32 1
Pakistan 7 0
Philippines 1 0
Poland 1 0
Serbia 7 0
Sweden 1 1
United Kingdom 6 2
United States 27 8
Vietnam 5 0
Total 120 16
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large-scale tobacco divestments (Angel & Rivoli, 1997; Ansar et al., 2013). The campaign 
started in the US and continued globally throughout the ‘90s. The cumulative amount of 
divested tobacco assets increased gradually until 2000, as seen in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Tobacco divestments, retrieved from Ansar et al. (2013) 
After 2000, the total cumulative amount of divested assets remained stable before increasing 
drastically in 2010 (Ansar et al., 2013). This was the year that NBIM liquidated all its tobacco 
stocks (Finance, 2010). As mentioned previously, the increase in the amount of total assets 
divested, i.e. assets excluded, can have an impact on the cost of equity capital. Therefore, we 
study whether the direct effect of exclusion on the cost of equity is significant in the years 
after 2010 compared to the years before.  
4.2 Data Sources and Requirements 
We obtain yearly financial data from Bloomberg, the World Bank, and Thompson Datastream 
in the period ranging from 2000 to 2018.  
The selected companies are required to have the requisite financial data from Thompson 
Datastream, to be publicly listed as of 2008 and at least until 2011, to have positive revenues, 
and to be classified with an industry SIC-code. All items are measured as of fiscal year-end 
and are quoted in US dollars.  
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4.3 Selection of Variables 
When examining the causal effect of exclusion, it is important to control for firm 
characteristics and other market factors that affect the cost of equity (COE). In this section, 
we present the variables accounting for these factors. We include traditional controls on the 
firm level (following e.g. Hail and Leuz (2009)) as well as proxies for country and industry 
effects. 
4.3.1 Dependent variable: Cost of equity capital 
There are different ways of calculating the cost of equity capital. Since there are no clear 
answers to which estimates provide the correct COE (Hail & Leuz, 2009), some studies use 
dividend yields or realized returns as proxies (Errunza & Miller, 2000; Foerster & Karolyi, 
1999).  
We use the Bloomberg terminal’s calculated COE, which is estimated through the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM): 
re=rf  +  𝜷(rm − rf) 
The model calculates a premium above the risk-free rate in the market, which depends on the 
stock’s beta. Bloomberg calculates each stock’s weekly beta by regressing the stock’s daily 
return on the local market daily return. The risk-free rate (rf) for each stock is the local 
government 10-year bond. The market return is set to each country’s historical market return.  
4.3.2 Independent variable: Exclusion 
The variable of interest determines the average difference in the cost of equity of  tobacco 
firms after exclusion, relative to food firms after exclusion. The variable is expressed as an 
interaction term between two dummy variables; one indicating whether the firm-year 
observation is after the exclusion period, 2010, and one indicating whether the firm is in the 
tobacco industry or not (AfterExcl * Tobacco). This variable is the Difference-In-Difference 
estimator and measures the average exclusion effect on the cost of equity. 
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4.3.3 Control variables 
To isolate the exclusion effect, control variables for firm and country characteristics known 
to affect the cost of equity must be included (Hail & Leuz, 2006). Cross-sectional variability 
can be presented by proxies for firm risk, e.g. volatility, size and book to market factors, as 
well as country factors measuring differences in macroeconomic variations and inflation 
(Hail & Leuz, 2006). Hail and Leuz (2006) further state that these factors can explain about 
60% of the country-level variation in COE around the world and 35% of the firm-level 
variation.  
Firm risks 
Size 
Based on previous studies (e.g. (Fama & French, 1992, 1993)), a firm’s size is expected to 
be negatively associated with the cost of equity capital. To control for a firm’s size, we use 
total assets instead of market capitalization because including a market value would absorb 
the hypothesized effect of exclusion if exclusion leads to lower valuation (following Hail 
and Leuz (2009)). Other studies (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009) use 
market capitalization at the end of year t.12  
Book to market ratio 
Fama and French (1992) argue that firms with higher book to market ratios tend to have 
higher returns, i.e. higher cost of equity capital. The ratio is also a proxy for the growth 
opportunities of a company, which may affect the cost of equity (e.g. (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002)). 
Volatility 
To control for a stock’s volatility, we use the volatility of daily stock return. According to 
previous studies (e.g. (Fama & French, 1992, 1993)), this is supposed to be positively 
associated with the cost of equity capital. An alternative to the daily stock return is a firm’s 
beta. However, to determine beta, one must address which equity index to use. If the 
international markets are considered integrated, the world index should be used, whereas if 
 
12 By replacing market capitalization with total assets, the results of our study presented in Section 5 and 6 do not change. 
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the market is segmented, the local index should be used. Following Hail and Leuz (2006, 
2009), this can be avoided when using the volatility of stock return.13 
Leverage 
Financial leverage is added as liabilities to total assets, which is predicted to have a positive 
sign on the cost of equity capital (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  
Country and industry risks 
Finally, it is important to control for country and industry fixed effects known to affect the 
cost of equity. According to Fama and French (1997) there is variation in factor loadings 
across industries. We could control for these industry variations by including one-digit SIC-
codes. However, since the fixed industry effects do not vary over time, the variable would be 
removed in the fixed effects model. Hence, we do not include any time-constant factors 
(country or industry factors) in our model because they would disappear. Therefore, we 
assume that the fixed differences within industries and countries will not explain a large part 
of COE.  
Further, country, industry, and firm time-varying effects, such as individual-specific shocks, 
economic risks, and differences in macroeconomic variability are known to affect COE 
(Ferson & Harvey, 1997; Hail & Leuz, 2006). We control for these variations in two different 
ways. First, we include an interaction term between individual dummies (Country or Industry) 
and the Year-dummy. This interaction term accounts for country- or industry-year specific 
factors (Hail & Leuz, 2006) and allows these factors to have different trends (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008). Second, we include the log of GDP per capita instead of the Country-Year 
interaction term, which controls for a country’s economic development. We explain each 
specification when presenting the different regression models. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents descriptive statistics of the data used to analyze the exclusion of tobacco 
companies. We describe the data for tobacco companies and food companies in the periods 
before and after exclusion, along with a visualization of the parallel trends assumption. 
 
13 By replacing the volatility of daily stock return with beta, the results presented in Section 5 and 6 do not change. 
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4.4.1 Summary statistics  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the cost of equity and all the control variables for 
food and tobacco companies.  
As presented, tobacco companies have a higher cost of equity on average than food producers 
both before and after exclusion. Further, the sample consists of more food companies than 
tobacco companies. There is also a different number of firm-year observations in the years 
before exclusion compared to the years after exclusion, implying that the panel data is 
unbalanced. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of tobacco and food firms 
 
We employ a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test to test whether the difference between the tobacco 
COE and the food COE before exclusion is significantly different than the difference after 
exclusion. The result implies that there is not a significant difference.14 However, when 
examining the hypothesis, we must control for other factors to isolate the exclusion effect. 
Therefore, in our multivariate model in Section 5, we control for the firm-specific variables as 
well as other macro factors.   
Cost of equity over time 
Figure 5 presents the yearly average cost of equity in the period ranging from 2000 until 2018 
for tobacco and food producers using Bloomberg’s COE estimates. The two industries follow 
similar patterns both before and after the exclusion period.  
 
14 The p-value of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is above 5%, rejecting the null that the difference in COE between tobacco 
firms and food firms before exclusion is significantly different than the difference after exclusion. 
2000-2009 2010-2018 2000-2009 2010-2018 2000-2009 2010-2018
BtoM (Mean) 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.38 8.13 0.43
Total Assets 000s USD (Mean) 13 777 14 580 14 221 23 214 14 059 19 805
Volatility (Mean) 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.24
Leverage (Mean) 0.92 0.98 0.63 0.58 0.73 0.74
Number observations (Mean) 101 118 190 184 291 302
COE (Mean) 8.28 8.20 7.97 8.04 8.13 8.02
COE (Median) 8.04 8.08 7.72 7.86 7.88 7.92
COE (Min) 4.51 4.27 5.70 5.70 4.51 4.27
COE (Max) 12.78 12.67 12.17 12.17 12.78 12.67
Tobacco Food All
 36
 
Figure 5: The average cost of equity over time for tobacco and food 
companies 
4.4.2 The assumption of parallel trends 
The parallel trends assumption is essential to interpret the results of the difference-in-
difference estimation causally, as mentioned in Section 3.1.2. The following graph (Figure 6) 
presents the observed average cost of equity estimates for all food and tobacco companies for 
the pre-exclusion period, as well as the corresponding trends. As seen, the industries exhibit 
similar trends in the pre-exclusion period, indicating that the assumption holds. Also, a t-test 
on the differences between the slopes finds no significant difference.15 
 
15 The t-test is presented in Appendix 10.7. 
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Figure 6: The parallel trends assumption for tobacco and food companies 
4.5 Treating outliers  
The sample of companies in this analysis is collected from a small population. Thus, the 
chances of potential outliers are high (Osborne & Overbay, 2004), which may increase error 
variance and reduce the power of the statistical tests. Also, when not randomly distributed 
outliers can decrease normality and bias the estimates of interest. With a small sample, it is 
important to carefully consider excluding outliers as they have a large impact on OLS 
estimates (Wooldridge, 2016). Osborne and Overbay (2004) state that outliers lie near three 
standard deviations from the mean and may have a disproportionately strong influence on the 
estimates. Following this, we remove the observations with these deviations when applying 
this on the cost of equity. We present this in Appendix 10.4.  
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5. Empirical Findings 
This section presents the results of the regression estimations performed to test our hypothesis. 
First, we present the main model specification in which determines the direct exclusion effect 
of tobacco firms on the COE. Second, we exclude the treatment years (2009 and 2010) in the 
analysis to make sure that the results are not affected by any announcement effects. Lastly, we 
perform an estimation separating the countries.  
5.1 Main Specification: Tobacco Exclusions 
Table 3 provides the results of the specification model presented in Section 3.2. It contains 
four regressions with COE as the dependent variable. The independent variable of interest is 
the interaction term between the dummy AfterExcl and the dummy Tobacco, representing the 
exclusion effect. For each regression, new variables are included to isolate the effect of 
exclusion. All estimations employ the fixed effects model with a difference-in-difference 
estimator.  
The DiD-estimator is the exclusion effect, i.e. the interaction between AfterExcl and Tobacco. 
Each model includes this interaction term as well as fixed effects for firm and year.16 The 
standard errors are shown in parenthesis based on Newey-West robust standard errors. 
The interaction term between AfterExcl and Tobacco is positive in all model specifications, 
however insignificant in model 1. The coefficient becomes significant at 5% in model 2, and 
the significance increases to 1% in model 3 and model 4. The interaction term is also 
economically meaningful and indicates that tobacco firms have approximately between 50 to 
60 basis points higher COE after exclusion, relative to food firms. These findings support our 
hypothesis that the direct effect of exclusion has a significant impact on tobacco firms’ cost of 
equity. 
 
16 The coefficients for the fixed effects and the intercept are not reported. 
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Table 3: Empirical findings of tobacco exclusions 
 
In model 1, the interaction term between AfterExcl and Tobacco, along with firm and year 
fixed effects, are the only variables. This model controls for unobserved factors that are 
constant over time within each firm (firm fixed effects) and factors that are constant across 
firms within a given year (year fixed effects). However, it does not control for other firm 
characteristics, leading to a low coefficient of determination. The model suggests that an 
excluded tobacco firm has higher COE on average, relative to food firms in the exclusion 
period (after 2010). The effect is not significant. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 show that adding more controls for firm-varying characteristics changes 
the magnitude and significance of the interaction term of interest, as well as the model fit, 
presented by R-squared. The interaction term becomes significant when controlling for other 
1 2 3 4
Volatility 1.698 1.738 2.232
(1.205) (1.221) (1.904)
log(TotalAssets) 0.244 0.263 0.218
(0.206) (0.206) (0.237)
log(BtoM) 0.075 0.258
** 0.030
(0.109) (0.121) (0.136)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 2.367
*** 0.901
(0.701) (0.879)
AfterExcl:Tobacco 0.084 0.577
**
0.581
***
0.639
***
(0.213) (0.228) (0.224) (0.230)
Year and Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year Interaction? No No No Yes
Observations 628 553 553 553
R
2 0.0003 0.023 0.039 0.503
Adjusted R
2 -0.098 -0.090 -0.074 0.179
F Statistic 0.151 (df = 1; 571)
2.858
**
 (df = 4; 
495)
4.040
***
 (df = 5; 
494)
2.052
***
 (df = 165; 
334)
Note:
*
p<0.1; 
**
p<0.05; 
***
p<0.01
Tobacco and Food Sample
Dependent variable:
COE 
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firm characteristics.17 This indicates that tobacco companies have higher COE on average after 
the exclusion, relative to food companies and that this effect is significant.  
The difference between model 3 and model 4 is that model 4 includes an interaction term 
between Country and Year to account for time-specific country effects that would otherwise 
be unobserved and captured by the error term (Hail & Leuz, 2009).18 The interaction term 
allows for different trends between the countries, such as new regulations affecting one or both 
industries (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). When adding the interaction term, the variables BtoM 
and LiabilitiesToTotalAssets lose their significance. This might reflect that differences within 
each firm over time are not that important to determine the COE as the cross-sectional 
differences between each firm. It may also mean that the time-varying country effects capture 
some of the firm-varying effects. 
Model 3 and model 4, which include all control variables, are the main model specifications 
of our analysis.  
5.1.1 Sample size and statistical inference 
In the regression models of Table 3, the coefficient of determination is very low, leading to a 
negative adjusted R-squared. The adjusted R-squared introduces punishment for including 
more explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2016). If the coefficient of determination does not 
increase after the punishment is introduced, the adjusted R-squared may be negative.  
The low R-squared may arise due to too much variation in the data set. The data used consists 
of a small sample which may increase variation, also mentioned in Section 4.5. Therefore, 
increasing the sample size e.g. by adding more years, could improve the results.  
 
17 The effect of economic performance in year t may not affect COE until year t+1. Following Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), we perform separate regressions lagging the variables for BtoM and TotalAssets one year. This does not affect our 
results. 
18 We also account for country time-specific effects by using the log of GDP per capita and the lagged log of GDP per capita 
instead of the Country*Year interaction term. This does not change our results. In addition to country time-specific factors, 
we add tobacco time-specific factors by including Tobacco*Year as an interaction term. This does not change the 
interpretation of the exclusion effect, i.e. the effect remains significant. Further, to control for possible regulations affecting 
COE, we add a variable for net income to total revenues. This does not change the sign or significance of the exclusion term. 
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5.2 Additional Analyses 
5.2.1 Excluding the treatment period 
Investors’ decisions of excluding specific industries are often announced before the actual 
exclusion takes place (e.g. due to transparency and preparation objectives). Following the 
theory of market efficiency (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969), the market may price in and 
react to the exclusion in advance. Hence, the transition period going from 2009 to 2010 might 
not be so clear. Therefore, we exclude these two firm-years in the models of Table 4 presented 
below. The difference between models 1 and 2 is that model 2 includes an interaction term 
between Country and Year to account for country time-specific effects.  
Table 4: Excluding transition period: 2009 and 2010 
 
The coefficient of exclusion (the interaction term between AfterExcl and Tobacco) is 
significant at a 5% level in both models and between 50 and 60 basis points. Thus, the COE 
of tobacco firms is higher on average relative to food firms after the exclusion period, even 
when accounting for possible announcement effects.  
1 2
log(BtoM) 0.328*** 0.169
(0.119) (0.138)
log(TotalAssets) 0.214 0.226
(0.212) (0.237)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 2.940*** 1.798**
(0.703) (0.837)
Volatility 0.996 0.933
(1.241) (1.889)
AfterExcl:Tobacco 0.579** 0.599**
(0.234) (0.241)
Year and Firm effects? Yes Yes
Country*Year Interaction? No Yes
Observations 496 496
R2 0.045 0.487
Adjusted R2 -0.076 0.148
F Statistic
4.178*** (df 
= 5; 439)
1.939*** (df 
= 146; 298)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Excluding 2009 and 2010
Dependent variable:
COE
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5.2.2 Separating countries 
This section extends the analysis of the relationship between exclusion and cost of equity 
capital by examining whether the direct exclusion effect differs between continents and 
countries. As this sample includes companies from Europe and the US, it is interesting to 
examine whether the direct exclusion effect of firms originating from Europe is stronger than 
of US firms since they have a long history of excluding “sin” firms. This analysis is also of 
interest if there is more variation between the continents than assumed in our main model. As 
mentioned, the fixed effects model removes these constant variations.  
To examine the cross-country differences, our sample is divided in two subsamples; firms 
originating from the US and firms originating from Europe. We run separate regressions for 
each subsample and account for firm and year fixed effects (shown in Table 5). Further, we 
add an interaction term between Country and Year in model 3 to control for time-specific 
country effects within Europe.  
Table 5: Separating continents 
 
The US Europe Europe
1 2 3
log(BtoM) 0.049 0.571*** -0.061
(0.169) (0.174) (0.222)
log(TotalAssets) 0.099 -0.087 0.499
(0.310) (0.428) (0.357)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 0.889 5.651*** 0.896
(1.067) (1.367) (1.834)
Volatility 2.266 0.387 2.241
(2.079) (1.664) (2.117)
AfterExcl:Tobacco 0.538* 0.606 0.789*
(0.304) (0.416) (0.444)
Year and Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year Interaction? No No Yes
Observations 288 265 265
R2 0.035 0.101 0.821
Adjusted R2 -0.125 -0.055 0.432
F Statistic
1.805 (df = 
5; 246)
5.032*** (df 
= 5; 225)
2.594*** (df 
= 147; 83)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Separating continents
Dependent variable:
COE 
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The exclusion effect in the US is significant at a 10% level, and the coefficient implies that 
tobacco firms’ COE is, on average, 0.538 higher than food firms’ COE after the exclusion 
period. For Europe, the exclusion effect becomes significant at a 10% level after controlling 
for country-varying characteristics, and the magnitude increases. Further, the coefficients 
show that the exclusion effect on average is higher for European firms than for US firms. 
Even though the significance of the exclusion term is reduced when examining each continent 
separately, the effect is still significant at a 10% level. These findings confirm our hypothesis 
and indicate that the direct exclusion effect of tobacco companies is positively associated with 
the cost of equity capital. The effect is significant. In the next section, we examine the direct 
effect of exclusion of coal firms on their cost of equity capital. 
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6. Exclusion of Coal Companies 
The previous section supports our hypothesis that the direct effect of exclusion of tobacco 
firms has a significant impact on the COE. The findings provided an answer to our first 
research question. However, to answer our supplementary research question of whether an 
increasing trend of excluding fossil fuel stocks will lead to a significant change in the COE, 
we investigate the exclusion effect of coal companies. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a trend of excluding fossil fuel firms and coal firms 
in particular. Coal firms have experienced a longer exclusion period compared to other fossil 
fuels and account for 44% of total humanmade CO2, which is the largest single source of 
global warming (Lewis, 2019). Thus, we choose to examine the exclusion effect of coal 
companies to discuss possible implications for the exclusion of fossil fuels.  
An important difference between coal firms and tobacco firms is that coal firms have the 
ability to reform their businesses without changing their main industry specification. The 
tobacco industry imposes a high societal cost, which can only be lowered by reducing the 
demand for tobacco products. Fossil fuels also impose a high societal cost in terms of carbon 
emission and increasing climate change. However, producing more renewable energy can 
reduce the societal cost (Skancke et al., 2014). Hence, coal companies can transform their 
business and thus avoid exclusions from “green investors” (Heinkel et al., 2001). 
Transforming their businesses might lead to an indirect effect of the companies’ cost of equity 
capital e.g. due to involvements in projects with lower risk. Therefore, we control for the 
possible indirect effect by including additional variables. 
In this analysis, we compare coal companies to carefully chosen comparable companies and 
use a fixed effects estimation with a difference-in-difference design. Thus, we use the same 
research design as the analysis for tobacco exclusions, described in Section 3. In the following 
section, we present the data for our sample, the exclusion period for coal firms, and additional 
variables needed to analyze the effect. Further, we summarize the data and present the results 
of the analysis. 
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6.1 Data 
6.1.1 Data sources and requirements 
We obtain yearly financial data from Bloomberg, the World Bank, and Thompson Datastream 
in the period ranging from 2004 to 2018. The selected companies are required to have the 
requisite financial data from Thompson Datastream, to be publicly listed as of 2013 and at 
least until 2016, to have positive revenues, and to be classified with an industry SIC-code. All 
items are measured as of fiscal year-end and are quoted in US dollars. 
The selected companies are required to originate from the US, Europe, or Canada. 
6.1.2 Selection of coal companies 
A selection of coal firms is chosen based on NBIM’s exclusion criteria. NBIM requires the 
coal companies to derive 30 percent or more of their revenues or operations from thermal coal 
(Norges Bank, 2016). The majority of the firms on their list have SIC-codes of 49-; “Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services”, while some have the SIC-code 1220; “Bituminous Coal & Lignite 
Mining”. Further, the selected coal companies are required to follow the requirements listed 
in Section 6.1.1. 
Table 6 presents an overview of the selected firms. 
Table 6: Selected coal firms 
 
Country Coal (SIC 1220) Possible coal (SIC 49-) Selected coal firms
Canada 3 15 3
China 35 75 0
Greece 0 2 1
Hong Kong 5 21 0
Indonesia 21 5 0
Other 27 141 0
Philippines 3 11 0
Poland 3 12 2
Spain 0 9 1
United Kingdom 6 10 1
United States 16 182 25
Total 119 483 33
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6.1.3 Selection of comparables 
We select comparable companies based on the SIC-codes of the majority of coal companies 
(4911, 4931, 4991), meaning that the comparable firms also operate in the electric service and 
gas sector. We gather all companies with these SIC-codes and select those originating the US, 
Canada, and Europe. Further, we screen each firm to make sure that it meets the requirements 
mentioned in Section 6.1. Lastly, we select the companies with a market capitalization above 
the coal firms’ average market capitalization.  
6.1.4 The coal exclusion period 
The Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign emerged in the US in 2011 and was initiated at US 
universities (Arabella Advisors, 2018). The campaign urged investors to divest their assets in 
fossil fuel companies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Ansar et al., 2013). By September 
2014, more than 50 billion USD was divested, and this number grew to 2.6 trillion USD in a 
year (Arabella Advisors, 2018). By September 2019, the total amount had increased to 11.48 
trillion USD. Figure 7 presents this development. 
 
Figure 7: Cumulative coal exclusions, retrieved from Cadan (2019) 
As mentioned, the total amount divested increased notably between the end of 2014 and the 
end of 2015. The period of exclusion is therefore chosen to the year-end of 2014. The year 
2015 was also the period in which large funds started excluding coal firms (Buckley, 2019). 
Further, the “Clean Power Plan” was proposed by the Obama administration this year (EPA, 
 47 
2015). This plan might have changed social norms concerning coal, leading to increased 
exclusion. 
We study whether the direct effect of exclusion of coal firms on the cost of equity is significant 
in the years of 2015 to 2018 compared to the years before, relative to the comparable 
companies.  
6.1.5 Additional variables 
The dependent variable: Cost of equity  
In this analysis, we use two different COE estimations. First, we use Bloomberg’s calculated 
COE, which is estimated through the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This estimation is 
the same as for the tobacco analysis. Second, we use two versions of the dividend discount 
model; Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).  
We use the additional COE estimations since previous research (e.g. (Fama & French, 1997))  
show that CAPM may not hold in the real world. Therefore, we follow Hail and Leuz (2006) 
and apply the Easton (2004) model and the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, which 
both estimate the ex-ante cost of equity implied from the stock price and analysts’ forecasts. 
These methods have the advantage of taking the degree of market segmentation as a given. 
However, the methods have limitations, such as the dependence on analysts’ forecasts and 
measurement errors in these forecasts (Hail & Leuz, 2009). The assumptions behind long- and 
short-term growth, the use of analysts’ forecast data, and the forecast period explain the 
differences between the methods. We average the results of the two methods and use this 
estimate as a proxy for COE.19 We explain the methods further in Appendix 10.1. 
Control variables  
Forecast dispersion (used for implied COE estimations) 
The implied COE estimation is dependent on analysts’ forecasts, which may have large 
differences. The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts reflects information uncertainty (Botosan & 
 
19 The implied cost of equity estimation is not used for the tobacco analysis. This is because of the low analyst coverage of tobacco firms, 
which might bias the results. Further, some tobacco firms have zero analyst coverage. Hence, many observations will be lost. 
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Plumlee, 2005; Chen, Jorgensen, & Yoo, 2004) and is predicted to have a positive sign on 
COE. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), we measure this variable as the variation of analysts’ 
EPS forecast one year ahead.  
Forecast deviation (used for implied COE estimations) 
Noise in analysts’ forecasts may affect the implied COE estimations (e.g. (Hail & Leuz, 
2006)), due to analysts being overly optimistic causing COE to be upward biased (El Ghoul et 
al., 2011) and systematic differences of forecast error in between countries (Hail & Leuz, 
2006). Therefore, we add forecast deviation when using the implied COE, defined as the 
difference between average consensus EPS one year forward and the actual EPS in a given 
year (Easton & Sommers, 2007). An increased difference indicates more uncertainty regarding 
future earnings (Guedhami & Mishra, 2009).   
Inflation (used for implied COE estimations) 
Hail and Leuz (2006) argue that inflation is an important variable when using the implied 
COE estimates because the inputs in these calculations are expressed in local currencies and 
nominal terms. Hence, the estimates reflect the countries’ expected inflation rates. We use 
the actual inflation rate in year t+1 as a proxy for the expected inflation rate in year t (Hail & 
Leuz, 2006). However, we predict the effect of this variable to be limited since the countries 
in our study have similar characteristics.  
Greenhouse gas emissions  
There is a positive association between greenhouse emissions and the cost of equity capital, 
e.g. due to different response to carbon threats (Kim et al., 2015). Also, Busch and 
Lewandowski (2018) find that companies with lower CO2 emissions have superior financial 
performance. We control for this by adding greenhouse emissions (scaled by revenue) as a 
variable, when using both Bloomberg COE and implied COE.  
Further, the greenhouse emissions variable might control for possible reformed coal 
companies. We have previously stated that coal firms have the ability to reform their business 
without changing their main industry specifications. Consequently, this can indirectly affect 
the COE, e.g. through involvements in projects with lower risk. 
We note that the greenhouse emissions data from Thompson Datastream is limited for some 
firms. 
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Net income scaled by revenue 
There may be new regulations affecting the coal industry in the studied time-period, which 
could affect a firm’s perceived risk. These regulations can be captured through the greenhouse 
emissions variable. However, due to data restrictions on the greenhouse emissions variable, 
we include net income divided by total revenues. 
6.1.6  Descriptive statistics 
We present summary statistics of the coal companies and the comparables in Table 7 by 
including all control variables as well as both estimation methods for COE. It is worth noticing 
that the specified coal companies have higher emissions (scaled by total revenues) than 
comparables both before and after exclusion. The mean of total emissions scaled by revenues 
is lower for both industries after exclusion. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of coal and comparable companies 
 
Cost of equity over time 
Figure 8 provides an overview of the cost of equity capital for coal companies and their 
comparable companies over time. The left figure uses Bloomberg estimations for COE while 
the right figure our average implied COE estimations. The firms follow similar patterns across 
the time-period of 2004 to 2018. 
2004-2014 2015-2018 2004-2014 2015-2018 2004-2014 2015-2018
BtoM (Mean) 0.75 0.90 0.65 0.57 0.71 0.75
Total Assets 000s USD (Mean) 17 294 22 181 22 419 32 468 19 406 26 922
Volatility (Mean) 0.24 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23
Leverage (Mean) 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.68
Forecast Dispersion (Mean) 0.36 0.33 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.22
Forecast Deviation (Mean) 0.23 0.23 0.41 0.50 0.30 0.35
Total Emissions To Revenue (Mean) 6.34 4.82 2.07 1.36 4.76 3.68
Bloomberg COE
COE Bloomberg (Mean) 9.11 7.26 8.62 7.33 8.91 7.29
COE Bloomberg (Min) 4.24 3.68 3.73 4.16 3.73 3.68
COE Bloomberg (Max) 14.17 13.60 13.95 13.12 14.17 13.60
Implied COE
COE Implied (Mean) 9.91 8.39 10.03 8.362 9.96 8.38
COE Implied (Min) 3.98 3.05 3.92 3.62 3.92 3.05
COE implied (Max) 17.79 17.60 18.03 17.56 18.03 17.60
Coal Comparables All
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Figure 8: The average cost of equity over time for coal and comparable 
companies 
The parallel trends assumption 
As stated in Section 3.1.2 the assumption of parallel trends must hold to use the difference-in-
difference design. Figure 9 presents the average cost of equity capital for coal companies and 
its comparable companies, along with its corresponding trends. The left figure uses Bloomberg 
estimates while the right figure uses implied COE estimates. 
The slopes show similar trends in the years leading up to the exclusion, indicating that the 
parallel trends assumption holds. We see some differences in the trends. However, we assume 
that those differences will be captured by the fixed effects. T-tests on the differences between 
the slopes find no significant difference.20 
 
 
20 The t-tests are presented in appendix 10.7. 
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Figure 9: The parallel trends assumption for coal and comparable 
companies 
6.2 Empirical Findings of Coal Exclusions 
In this section, we present different models used to examine whether the direct effect of the 
exclusions of coal companies on the cost of equity is significant. The results presented in Table 
8 show that the direct effect (represented by the interaction term between AfterExcl and Coal) 
is insignificant in all model specifications.  
Each regression model includes firm and year fixed effects, along with several control 
variables for firm characteristics. Models 1, 2, and 3 use Bloomberg COE estimates, while 
models 4, 5, and 6 use our implied COE estimates following the models of Easton (2004) and 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Further, we include an interaction term between Country 
and Year in model 3 and model 6 to account for possible time-specific country effects. We 
add the NetIncomeToRevenue variable in all models  to capture new regulations or legislations 
affecting each firm.21 
The interaction term between AfterExcl and Coal is insignificant in all models and has 
different signs and magnitudes. When accounting for an interaction between Country and Year 
 
21 Instead of using NetIncometoTotalRevenues, we also include an interaction between Coal and Year, which could capture 
year-specific industry effects such as new regulations. This does not change the sign or significance of the exclusion term. 
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in model 3 and model 6, the magnitude of the sign is small using both COE estimations, 
indicating a limited economic significance of exclusion.  
Table 8: Empirical findings of coal exclusions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
log(BtoM) 0.801
***
0.450 -0.522
*
0.911 1.304
*
0.185
(0.249) (0.297) (0.275) (0.568) (0.776) (0.995)
log(TotalAssets) 0.187 -0.698
*
-0.321 0.549 1.760
** 1.596**
(0.254) (0.377) (0.375) (0.704) (0.781) (0.885)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 1.224 0.148 3.558* 0.806 5.607 5.959
(1.410) (2.159) (2.038) (3.222) (5.150) (5.314)
Volatility 5.127
*** 9.583*** 5.254*** 0.370 0.973 0.604
(0.911) (1.382) (1.246) (1.673) (3.299) (3.258)
log(NetIncomeToRevenue) -0.098 -0.128 0.046 -0.445
*
0.151 -0.135
(0.125) (0.133) (0.119) (0.246) (0.347) (0.365)
TotalEmissionstoRevenues 0.032 0.017 -0.100 -0.039
(0.052) (0.040) (0.077) (0.082)
log(1 + ForecastDeviation) 3.888
***
-0.089 0.338
(1.010) (1.688) (2.479)
log(1 + ForecastDispersion) -0.699 -4.060 0.050
(2.653) (3.297) (5.055)
Inflationexpected -0.001 0.002 0.847
*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.500)
AfterExcl:Coal -0.060 0.181 -0.272 0.457 0.611 0.182
(0.189) (0.253) (0.220) (0.369) (0.445) (0.446)
Year and firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year Interaction? No No Yes No No Yes
COE estimate: Bloomberg Bloomberg Bloomberg Implied Implied Implied
Observations 671 369 369 564 313 313
R2 0.166 0.252 0.632 0.088 0.089 0.287
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.092 0.291 -0.050 -0.150 0.002
F Statistic
19.620*** (d
f = 6; 592)
14.601*** (d
f = 7; 303)
8.136*** (df 
= 54; 256)
5.222*** (df 
= 9; 489)
2.421*** (df 
= 10; 247)
2.636*** (df 
= 34; 223)
Note:
Coal and Comparables
Bloomberg  Implied
Dependent variable: COE
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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We include emissions data in four of the models.22 The emissions data does not seem to impact 
the significance of the interaction term between AfterExcl and Coal. However, the sign of the 
coefficient changes when using the Bloomberg estimate.   
The insignificance of the interaction terms, AfterExcl*Coal, indicates that there is not a 
significant direct exclusion effect of coal companies on the COE (Table 8). However, we note 
that the results must be interpreted with caution due to data restrictions, such as limited 
emissions data and a short time-period after exclusion.  
Excluding the treatment period 
As mentioned, investors’ decisions of excluding specific industries are often announced before 
the actual exclusion takes place (e.g. due to transparency and preparation objectives). Hence, 
the transition period going from 2014 to 2015 might not be so clear. Therefore, we exclude 
these two firm-years in the models of Table 9 presented below. Models 1 and 2 use the 
Bloomberg estimates for COE, while models 3 and 4 use the Implied COE estimates. We 
include an interaction term between Country and Year in models 2 and 4, but do not include 
TotalEmissionstoRevenue due to its insignificance in Table 8 and the loss of observations. 
The coefficient of exclusion (the interaction term between AfterExcl and Tobacco) is 
insignificant all models and has different signs and small magnitudes. These findings further 
support the previous results of no significant direct exclusion effect of coal companies on the 
COE. 
 
 
 
22 Due to data restrictions, we lose many observations when including TotalEmissionstoRevenues 
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Table 9: Excluding the treatment period: 2014 and 2015 
 
1 2 3 4
log(BtoM) 1.440
*** 0.770** 1.360*** 0.747**
(0.383) (0.370) (0.427) (0.381)
log(TotalAssets) 0.143 0.057 0.263 -0.139
(0.307) (0.396) (0.323) (0.349)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 2.777 1.805 1.998 0.134
(1.830) (2.080) (1.669) (1.595)
Volatility 5.459
*** 3.645** 6.491*** 4.718***
(1.376) (1.458) (1.442) (1.606)
log(NetIncomeToRevenue) 0.205 0.369
** 0.254* 0.254*
(0.143) (0.151) (0.143) (0.144)
log(1 + ForecastDispersion) -2.935
**
-0.201
(1.289) (0.860)
log(1 + ForecastDeviation) 0.892 0.503
(0.744) (0.661)
Inflationexpected 0.001 0.009
*
(0.003) (0.005)
Afterexcl:Coal 0.190 -0.150 0.231 -0.165
(0.240) (0.181) (0.242) (0.172)
Year and Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year interaction? No Yes No Yes
Observations 576 576 521 521
R2 0.169 0.437 0.230 0.516
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.293 0.101 0.384
F Statistic
16.969*** (df = 
6; 499)
7.563*** (df = 
47; 458)
14.795*** (df = 
9; 445)
9.673*** (df = 
45; 409)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Excluding 2014 and 2015
Dependent variable: COE
Bloomberg Implied
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7. Limitations 
The previous analyses state that the direct effect of exclusion is significant for tobacco firms 
but insignificant for coal firms. We discuss the implications of these results in Section 8. In 
this section, we consider potential limitations that could bias the inference of the results. 
Further, we present several robustness issues.  
7.1 Overestimation of the Exclusion Effect 
Hedging against diversification loss (spillover effects) 
The exclusion effect could be overestimated due to several reasons. First, the effect could be 
overestimated if the cost of equity of comparable companies decreases in the post-exclusion 
period as a result of the direct exclusion effect of excluded companies. Following Luo and 
Balvers (2017), this can happen if “green” investors want to diversify their portfolio by buying 
more non-excluded stocks that correlate with the stocks they have excluded. Thus, the 
exclusion effect can be overestimated if a significant number of “green” investors that exclude 
tobacco firms instead want to invest in food firms to increase their portfolio diversification. 
As a consequence, the demand for food stocks will increase, leading to an increased price. Due 
to the diversification benefits of investing in food stocks, “green” investors will not require a 
higher return (COE). Therefore, the difference between the COE of tobacco stocks and the 
COE of food stocks post-exclusion might increase (Luo & Balvers, 2017).  
Second, when “neutral” investors give up food stocks (because “green” investors want to 
diversify their portfolios), they may want to hedge this loss of diversification by investing in 
stocks correlating with food (e.g. tobacco) (following Luo and Balvers (2017)). In order for 
the “neutral” investors to hold more of the excluded stocks, causing an unbalanced portfolio, 
they would require an even higher return. This hedge against diversification loss increases the 
direct effect of exclusion.  
Other policy implementations 
Further, the effect might be overestimated if it captures the effect of other policy 
implementations or other exogenous factors. The tobacco and coal industry are exposed to 
several industry regulations. We control for this by including both industry and country time-
specific factors (dummies for industry and country interacted with year, as well as GDP per 
capita each year) in addition to emissions data for coal firms, depending on the model 
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specification. However, these variables might fail to capture the full extent of regulations, 
which could bias the exclusion effects.   
Other factors affecting COE 
Tobacco firms and coal firms might have experienced increased returns in the studied time-
periods due to increased litigation risks known to affect the COE (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). 
Negative social norms can heighten litigation risks. Hence, the exclusion effects could capture 
the effects of increased litigation risks if the negative social norms started at the same time as 
exclusion. 
Further, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that norm-constrained institutions hold less “sin 
stocks” than comparable stocks. These findings can be explained by the institutions’ exposure 
to social norms and their attempt to stay away from carbon risk and CSR risk. According to 
previous literature, there is a positive correlation between firm value and institutional 
ownership (e.g. McConnell and Servaes (1990)), and it is often stated that firms with higher a 
fraction of institutional owners have a lower cost of capital (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). 
Therefore, since the chosen exclusion periods in our analyses are selected based on exclusions 
by large funds, the exclusion effects could capture the relationship between the share of 
institutional owners and the cost of equity. However, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) find no 
significant relationship between the percentage of institutional holders and the cost of equity. 
Therefore, it is likely that the exclusion effect is not notably impacted by the relationship 
between institutional owners and the COE.   
7.2 Robustness Issues 
In this section, we discuss our model choice and possible spatial correlation issues. We present 
additional robustness issues and tests in the Appendix. 
7.2.1 Model choice  
We use the fixed effects (FE) model in our analyses. Alternative models are the random effects 
(RE) model, the pooled OLS (POLS) model, and the first difference (FD) model.  
 57 
When comparing FE to RE and FE to POLS using the Hausman and F-test, respectively, both 
results indicate that FE is the most efficient model.23 These results implies that there are fixed 
factors not observed in the data which affect COE. The fixed effects model, which includes 
year and firm fixed effects, captures these unobserved effects. 
Further, FE is used instead of the FD model. With a two-period sample, the two methods 
would obtain the same results (Wooldridge, 2016), but with three or more periods, the two 
methods are different. Both methods are unbiased under the first four OLS assumptions (listed 
in appendix 10.2), but require the strict exogeneity assumption to hold (that the unobserved 
varying errors are uncorrelated with the independent variables) and variation in variables 
across time.  
The fixed effects estimation has an advantage when the data has many missing values, which 
is the case in our sample (Wooldridge, 2016). The FD estimation will then lose two 
observations when one period is missing. However, the FD estimation might be more efficient 
with serially correlated errors. Since the tobacco analysis and coal analysis exhibit serially 
correlated errors, we also estimate the model using the FD estimation. The results and 
interpretation of the exclusion of tobacco and coal remain unchanged. 
7.2.2 Accounting for spatial correlation 
In panel data, there is dependence across the time dimension (serial correlation) and within 
each cross-section (within firm, country, or industry). Therefore, our model follows a two-way 
clustering of standard errors.24 We report this using Newey-West corrected standard errors, 
which also allows for heteroscedasticity.  
Serial correlation in Difference-in-Difference estimation  
Another way to assess serial correlation issues is by averaging the pre- and post-exclusion data 
and then repeat the difference-in-difference estimation (following e.g. (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Li, 2010)). We present this in Table 10. 
 
23 The p-values are below 0.05, indicating that FE is the most efficient model. 
24 Tests for cross-sectional dependence and serial correlation in the errors are presented in the Appendix. 
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The exclusion term is positive for the tobacco and coal sample. The effect remains significant 
for the exclusion of tobacco firms, which supports our hypothesis that the exclusion can have 
a direct effect on the COE. The effect is insignificant for the coal sample when using both the 
Bloomberg COE estimate and the Implied COE estimate. Hence, these results are in line with 
our previous findings. 
Table 10: Regression results using aggregated data 
 
COE Implied
Tobacco sample Coal Sample Coal Sample
1 2 3
Afterexcl -0.976 -2.104
***
-0.018
(1.002) (0.363) (0.012)
log(BtoM) 1.043 0.851 0.051
*
(0.712) (0.897) (0.026)
log(TotalAssets) 1.136
**
0.967 0.006
(0.499) (0.615) (0.017)
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 6.404
***
-6.565 0.129
(2.155) (6.221) (0.081)
Volatility -6.494
*
2.963 -0.053
(3.607) (3.351) (0.075)
log(NetIncomeToRevenue) -0.894
* 0.014*
(0.462) (0.007)
log(1 + ForecastDispersion) 0.014
(0.111)
log(1+ForecastDeviation) 0.092
***
(0.033)
Afterexcl:tobacco 0.893
**
(0.432)
Afterexcl:Coal 0.250 0.003
(0.340) (0.005)
Firm fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year Dummy? Yes No No
Observations 66 100 87
R2 0.959 0.826 0.722
Adjusted R2 0.811 0.546 0.113
F Statistic
20.667*** (df = 16; 
14)
25.721*** (df = 7; 
38) 7.776*** (df = 9; 27)
Note:
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Aggregated Data
Dependent variable: COE
COE Bloomberg
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8. Discussion of Empirical Findings 
In this section, we discuss the impact of exclusionary investing and its effect on the cost of 
equity capital. In theory, there may be two effects of exclusion on the cost of equity capital; 
the direct and indirect effect. We study only the direct effect. Our results in Section 5 suggest 
that the direct effect of exclusion of tobacco firms can raise the COE. The results are in line 
with previous literature stating that with the same number of investors and companies in the 
economy, the cost of equity will rise for the excluded companies due to diversification 
limitations and limited risk-sharing (Heinkel et al., 2001; Merton, 1987). Further, our results 
in Section 6 suggest that the direct effect of excluding coal companies is not significant on the 
COE.  
In this section, we discuss the direct effect of excluding tobacco firms in light of the theories 
presented in Section 2 and implications for the tobacco firms. Further, we use the findings of 
the tobacco analysis in addition to the study of coal exclusions to discuss potential implications 
for exclusions of fossil fuels. Lastly, we introduce the importance of the indirect effect of 
exclusion and discuss implications for the investors. 
8.1 The Direct Effect of Tobacco Exclusions 
Studying the direct effect of exclusionary investing, we find that tobacco stocks are associated 
with an increased cost of equity after exclusion. This effect is significant at 1% and indicates 
that tobacco stocks have 50 to 60 basis points higher COE after exclusion, relative to food 
firms. Our results are consistent with our hypothesis that exclusionary investing has a 
significant impact on the tobacco stocks’ cost of equity. In general, we explain the significant 
effect on COE by reduced demand for tobacco stocks, causing limited risk-sharing, which in 
turn increases the COE. To explain the mechanisms behind this increase, we apply the theories 
introduced in Section 2.  
Following Merton (1987) segmentation theory, the equilibrium model of Heinkel et al. (2001) 
can explain why tobacco stocks experience higher COE after exclusion. The reduced investor 
base limits diversification opportunities for tobacco stockholders and causes idiosyncratic risk 
to be shared among fewer investors (Merton, 1987). This effect can be significant if a sufficient 
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number of investors exclude tobacco stocks (Heinkel et al., 2001). 25 Hence, our results imply 
that a sufficient number of investors have excluded tobacco stocks after 2010 compared to 
before 2010. According to Heinkel et al. (2001), a 10% share of “green” investors (not 
investing in tobacco) is enough to raise COE notably. Empirical findings have found that about 
10-15% of investors exclude “sin stocks” (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). According to Luo and 
Balvers (2017), 96% of global SRI funds screen tobacco stocks, and the number is increasing. 
Following Heinkel et al. (2001) and previous research, our results imply that at least 10% of 
investors exclude tobacco stocks and that the COE is raised notably.  
The more recent model of Luo and Balvers (2017), building on the intuition of Merton (1987) 
and Fama and French (2007), can also be used to explain why tobacco stocks experience 
increased COE after exclusion. The model assumes that some investors have nonpecuniary 
preferences for holding assets, implying that the CAPM is no longer valid. Thus, a systematic 
risk factor emerges (the “boycott” factor) in addition to the market factor. Consequently, all 
stocks in the market are affected by their return covariance with the “boycott” factor. After 
exclusion, non-excluding investors require a premium for being exposed to the “boycott” 
factor. Further, other stocks positively correlated with tobacco stocks will also have a premium 
(potential further study).  
Implications for tobacco companies 
Our findings imply that tobacco companies have higher COE due to exclusionary effects, 
relative to food firms. Tobacco companies can likely expect this increase to continue in the 
future, as the amount of socially responsible investors is increasing.  
Higher capital costs might reduce the economic profit of firms’ activities (Angel & Rivoli, 
1997). Increased equity capital costs for tobacco firms might induce a shift towards more debt 
capital. However, since socially responsible factors might also influence the debt market, such 
a shift is not necessarily beneficial (Ansar et al., 2013). 
Applying the Heinkel et al. (2001) model, tobacco firms will benefit from reforming its 
businesses when the difference in returns between tobacco stocks and other comparable stocks 
 
25Heinkel et al. (2001) find that acceptable firms have lower expected return than unacceptable firms when there is a sufficient 
number of “green” investors in the market and that this difference increases with the number of “green” investors (given the 
same systematic risk for each frim). 
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is significant. According to the model, 25% of the investor base must be “green” (i.e. not 
investing in tobacco stocks) to induce the tobacco firms to reform. However, tobacco firms 
have limited opportunities to reform their businesses (Skancke et al., 2014). Hence, this might 
not apply to tobacco firms.   
8.2 The Implications of Fossil Fuel Exclusions 
The analysis of the exclusion of tobacco companies can provide implications for fossil fuels, 
which currently experience an increasing trend of exclusionary investing. To apply the results 
of the tobacco analysis, we must address important differences between tobacco stocks and 
fossil fuel stocks. We consider these differences in Section 8.2.1. Further, we discuss the 
results of the analysis of coal exclusions. Lastly, we use both analyses to provide implications 
regarding oil and gas exclusions. 
8.2.1 Differences between tobacco and fossil fuels  
There are several differences between the tobacco industry and the fossil fuel industry in which 
affect the extent of the direct exclusion effect. First, the tobacco industry imposes a high 
societal cost that can only be reduced by lowering the demand for tobacco products. The use 
of fossil fuels also imposes a high societal cost in terms of carbon emissions. However, the 
cost can be reduced by producing more renewable energy (Skancke et al., 2014). Hence, fossil 
fuel companies can reform their businesses and thus avoid exclusion by “green” investors in 
the future (Heinkel et al., 2001).  
Second, the tobacco industry has been subject to negative social norms for several decades 
(Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). In contrast, the fossil fuels industry has not experienced this 
extent of negative social norms, implying limited fossil fuel exclusions (Ansar et al., 2013).  
Third, the industries have different exposure to the market. The tobacco stocks have a beta 
around 0.5, whereas the fossil fuel stocks often have a beta around 1 (A. Trinks et al., 2018). 
Further, the fossil fuels industry accounts for a larger share of the equity market compared to 
the tobacco industry.  
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8.2.2 The direct effect of coal exclusions 
Contrary to our analysis of tobacco exclusions, there is no significant direct exclusion effect 
on the cost of equity for coal companies. According to Heinkel et al. (2001), this implies that 
the current magnitude of investors who exclude coal companies is not sufficient to have an 
effect on the firms’ cost of equity. Hence, the reduced investor base does not limit investors’ 
diversification opportunities and risk-sharing in a way that increases the idiosyncratic risk 
significantly. Further, the results imply that the “boycott” factor that arises with a restricted 
investment universe is not significant, i.e. that there is no significant systematic “boycott” 
premium for coal firms (Luo & Balvers, 2017).  
The low share of total AuM excluding coal stocks supports our results (A. Trinks et al., 2018). 
Thus, the magnitude of coal exclusions must increase to have a significant effect on the cost 
of equity (Heinkel et al., 2001). Also, A. Trinks et al. (2018) find a significant 
underperformance of coal stocks on portfolio performance in the period between 2011 and 
2016 (during The Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaign period (Arabella Advisors, 2018)).   
8.2.3 Implications for oil and gas companies 
Following the theory of Heinkel et al. (2001), negative screening of fossil fuel companies 
needs to be conducted by a sufficient number of investors to have a direct effect on the firm’s 
price and the firm’s cost of equity. An increasing exclusion trend of fossil fuel companies 
might induce such effect in the coming years.  
Coal is the most polluting fossil fuel and has thus been the primary focus among many 
exclusionary investors. However, many investors exclude all fossil fuels, including oil and gas 
stocks. The exclusion of all fossil fuels is also the aim of the fossil fuel campaign that started 
in 2011. Therefore, we also discuss possible implications of excluding oil and gas firms.  
The magnitude of oil and gas exclusions is low, and the share of “green” investors in these 
markets is smaller than for coal firms (Ansar et al., 2013; A. Trinks et al., 2018). Ansar et al. 
(2013) state that the maximum possible capital of fossil fuels to be excluded by large public 
pension funds or university endowments represent a small pool of funds, relative to the total 
market capitalization of all fossil fuel companies. Hence, the direct impact on the firms’ cost 
of equity might be limited. 
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The limited magnitude of excluded oil and gas stocks might be a consequence of these stocks 
accounting for a large share of the market (Luo & Balvers, 2017), implying a great loss of 
diversification for investors when excluding these companies. Also, the relatively new trend 
of negative social norms towards the industry and the many consumers and businesses who 
rely on oil and gas firms might limit the exclusion of these firms.  
Exclusions of oil and gas companies could potentially have huge implications on the market. 
Many companies use these energy sources as input and thus rely on the services of the oil and 
gas firms.26 With a significant exclusion effect of oil and gas firms, the cost of equity of 
companies that rely on and correlate with oil and gas firms would also be affected  (Luo & 
Balvers, 2017). Further, due to the oil and gas firms’ large share of the market, the market 
composition would change with a sufficient number of exclusionary investors (Luo & Balvers, 
2017). Hence, the effect on the market can potentially be huge and more extensive compared 
to coal firms’ effect on the market.  
However, we recognize that these impacts on the market will not happen unless the amount 
of excluded assets increases notably. This is further supported by the oil and gas companies’ 
ability to transform their business, indicating that the companies can respond to exclusions 
e.g. by shifting production towards more renewable energy (Heinkel et al., 2001). A 
transformed business is beneficial if the fixed cost of incorporating the new operations and 
the return of the new business combined has a smaller cost than the cost of a restricted 
investor base. Due to the ability to transform, we believe that the oil and gas firms would be 
proactive and choose this option before the direct effect of exclusion becomes significant.  
8.2.4 Sensitivity of the direct exclusion effect on COE 
As stated, the current amount of excluded oil and gas stocks will not have a significant impact 
on COE unless the amount of excluded assets increases notably. To estimate the theoretical 
change in a firm’s COE due to exclusion, we can apply the model presented by Angel and 
Rivoli (1997). The model indicates that a firm’s cost of equity increases as the share of “green” 
investors increases. Further, the cost of equity will increase the larger the weight of the firm 
in the market portfolio, when the investors’ risk aversion is high and when the variance of the 
 
26 Fossil fuels are the primary source of electricity in North America (EIA, 2018).  
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firm’s return due to firm-specific factors increase. We note that the model has limitations, and 
thus, we apply it only for illustration purposes.  
We apply the model to estimate the theoretical exclusion effect on a company by using a fictive 
US oil company. We use Merton’s risk aversion of 2 and a firm-specific risk of 40%. First, 
we assume a closed economy with only US investors and US firms. In this economy, the 
market share of the oil company is approximately 0.97%. Second, we assume an open, global 
economy, including all investors and firms. In such economy, the company’s market share is 
only 0.43%. 
Holding all variables constant, we can examine the effect on the cost of equity at different 
levels of “green” investors. As shown in Figure 10, the cost of equity increases when the share 
of “green” investors increases. Further, the closed economy has a larger impact on the cost of 
equity, compared to an open economy. Therefore, this model implies that firms with larger 
market shares are more affected by exclusionary investing than firms with smaller market 
shares. 
 
Further, we perform a sensitivity analysis of the oil firm in a closed economy, varying the 
volatility and the proportion of “green” investors. At a given level of “green” investors, the 
change in the cost of equity is greater for firms with higher firm-specific risk, implying that 
riskier companies should expect a more substantial increase in their cost of equity capital.  
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Table 11: Sensitivity analysis on the change in COE, applying the Angel 
and Rivoli (1997) model 
 
As Table 11 shows, the effect on COE will remain limited unless the share of “green” investors 
is large. However, this model has limitations and should thus be interpreted with caution.  
8.2.5 The indirect effect of fossil fuels exclusions 
Even though it is possible that the COE of fossil fuel companies can change due to the direct 
effect of exclusion, we recognize that the probability of a significant direct effect is low. 
However, even with limited excluded outflows, exclusion might have an indirect effect on 
COE (Ansar et al., 2013).  
Exclusion strategies and divestment campaigns might lead to changes in social norms, which 
could cause pressure on the firms (e.g. through new regulations) (Ansar et al., 2013). Hence, 
exclusion strategies can create uncertainty regarding the business or the environment, i.e. 
increased perceived firm risk. The increased risk for oil and gas companies could, for example, 
be legal, environmental, political-economic, or regulatory (such as new taxes on carbon use) 
(Ansar et al., 2013).27  
Further, exclusion might induce a change in the excluded firms’ operations and investments. 
As mentioned, the global market capitalization of fossil fuel companies is large (A. Trinks et 
al., 2018). Hence, the exclusion of fossil fuels could potentially have a large impact on an 
investor’s financial return and the society if the firms’ cost of equity increase significantly. 
 
27 In example, the “Clean Power Plan” proposed by the Obama administration in 2014 pressured fossil fuel companies towards 
the production of greener energy. The plan aimed to reduce carbon emissions by 32% by 2030 and focused on reducing 
emissions from coal-burning power plants (EPA, 2015).  
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The possible effect on the cost of equity can motivate the firms to change their operations to 
become more attractive for investors. These changes in business operations could imply a 
different cost of equity. Oil and gas companies have already started responding to the increased 
pressure towards more environmental friendly energy sources. For example, Equinor is 
expanding its investments in renewable energy projects and BP has rebranded its business into 
more “green” energy sources to meet “green” investors’ preferences (Ansar et al., 2013).  
The current magnitude of exclusion has a negligible direct effect on fossil fuel companies’ 
cost of equity. Going forward, it is likely that the indirect effect will have the most impact 
through changes in social norms and pressure on companies towards more “green” operations.  
8.3 Implications of Exclusions for the Investors 
As mentioned, a majority of previous studies have found limited effect of exclusions on 
portfolio performance (e.g. Diltz (1995) and Skancke (2016)), i.e. that the performance of 
exclusionary portfolios are not significantly different from other portfolios.  
8.3.1 Tobacco exclusions 
If the goal of exclusionary investing is to increase the cost of equity of tobacco stocks, we find 
evidence that this is achievable. However, we do not test the effect of excluding tobacco stocks 
on investors’ portfolio performance, but our analysis provides implications for the investors 
worth mentioning. P. J. Trinks and Scholtens (2017) find that the effect depends on the value 
of the excluded stocks’ market capitalization. The tobacco industry represents a small share 
of the market, implying limited diversification costs for investors when excluding tobacco 
firms. Thus, exclusionary investing of tobacco stocks might not have a significant effect on 
investors’ portfolio performance. However, the diversification costs for investors might be 
high due to tobacco stocks’ low correlation to the market. Whether or not the investors’ 
portfolio performance will be affected by exclusions depends on these effects. Hence, 
investors could impose a direct effect on tobacco firms’ COE without affecting the return of 
their portfolios significantly. 
8.3.2 Oil and gas exclusions 
Exclusion of oil and gas companies could have a different impact on investors’ portfolio 
performances compared to the exclusion of tobacco companies (Angel and Rivoli (1997)). 
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Oil and gas companies represent a larger share of the market portfolio (Ansar et al., 2013). 
Thus, the diversification constraints could be larger for the investor when excluding the oil 
and gas companies from the portfolio. Consequently, “neutral” investors would require a 
higher COE for holding additional oil and gas stocks. Further, A. Trinks et al. (2018) state 
that the beta of tobacco stocks is close to 0.5, whereas the beta of fossil fuel stocks is about 
0.5, implying that the diversification benefits of investing in oil and gas stocks are limited 
(Luo & Balvers, 2017). Hence, “neutral” investors would require a higher COE. However, 
these effects might be mitigated if a sufficient number of investors exclude oil and gas 
companies, changing the composition of the market. Whether the impact on portfolio 
performance will be larger for oil and gas exclusions compared to tobacco exclusions 
depends on the extent of these effects. 
8.3.3 Concluding remarks on exclusionary investing 
A potential diminishing effect of exclusion 
A potential weakness of exclusionary investing might be wealth shifting back to “neutral” 
investors, diminishing the impact of exclusionary investing. “Neutral” investors will continue 
to require a higher average return as the share of “green” investors continue to increase. Hence, 
the difference between the expected returns of “neutral” and “green” investors continues to 
grow (Heinkel et al., 2001). Also, assuming that “neutral” investors are less concerned about 
the responsibility of the excluded firms, the effect of exclusionary investing could be further 
diminished. 
Exclusion vs. active ownership 
Investors who are concerned with the ethical and social issues of a company face a choice 
between different strategies of SRI. An ongoing debate is whether investors should perform 
exclusionary investing or engage in the company through active ownership.  
The exclusion of companies that cannot reform might be an appropriate strategy if the 
magnitude of investors that exclude is sufficient. However, if one believes that the excluded 
firms will continue their operations regardless of exclusions, engagement might be more 
appropriate due to ethical issues.  
We assume that tobacco companies cannot reform. Hence, exclusionary investing might be an 
appropriate strategy, supported by our findings, which imply that exclusions increase the cost 
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of equity of tobacco firms. In contrast, oil and gas companies have the ability to reform and 
will likely continue their operations. Additionally, the amount of total excluded assets needs 
to be substantial to have a direct effect on the firm. Therefore, engagement through active 
ownership might be a more appropriate strategy. 
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9. Conclusion 
There is a debate regarding the value and the implications of exclusionary investing. We 
contribute to the literature on exclusionary investing by examining the direct effect on 
excluded stocks’ cost of equity, meaning the financial effect of investors selling the stock. We 
analyze this by examining tobacco firms, testing our hypothesis: The direct effect of exclusion 
has a significant impact on a tobacco firm’s cost of equity capital. 
We employ the fixed effects model with a difference-in-difference estimation, in which we 
examine tobacco firms compared to food firms with similar characteristics. Hence, our 
approach captures the direct effect of exclusion by testing whether tobacco firms have a higher 
cost of equity, relative to food firms after exclusion.  
Our findings suggest that the exclusion of tobacco firms has a significant impact on the 
companies’ cost of equity. Therefore, exclusionary investing can be an appropriate strategy if 
the aim is to increase the companies’ cost of equity. We explain the significance of the effect 
through two theoretical frameworks; a market segmentation model (Heinkel et al., 2001; 
Merton, 1987) and a model for the “boycott” premium (Luo & Balvers, 2017). By excluding 
tobacco firms, the market becomes segmented, and the stocks’ idiosyncratic risks increase due 
to limited risk-sharing and restricted diversification opportunities. Further, exclusionary 
investing separates investors into two groups due to unequal preferences. Thus, the CAPM no 
longer holds, and a systematic risk factor arises, known as the “boycott” factor (Luo & Balvers, 
2017). Additionally, the demand for tobacco stocks will be lowered due to exclusion. Hence, 
“neutral” investors will require an additional premium, i.e. a higher COE, for holding tobacco 
stocks.  
Additionally, we examine the exclusion of fossil fuel firms, which currently experience an 
increasing trend of exclusionary investors. The coal industry has been the primary focus for 
exclusions within the fossil fuel industry. We study the exclusion of coal companies relative 
to carefully chosen comparable companies not excluded by investors. The results indicate that 
the exclusion of coal firms has no significant direct effect on the companies’ cost of equity, 
suggesting that the amount of excluded assets is not sufficient (Heinkel et al., 2001). Hence, 
the direct effect of excluding oil and gas companies might be limited. This is further supported 
by the oil and gas firms’ large shares of the market, the many businesses and consumers who 
rely on oil and gas services, and the low amount of assets currently excluded. However, we 
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note that if a sufficient number of investors exclude the oil and gas firms in the future, the 
firms might benefit from reforming their businesses. Thus, exclusionary investing can induce 
changes in oil and gas firms’ operations by increasing the firms’ cost of equity. 
9.1 Possible further research 
A further extension of our study could be to examine the exclusion effect on the cost of debt. 
Ansar et al. (2013) state that if a bank restricts its debt financing of a company, other banks 
might offer debt if they perceive the expected cash flows of the company as the same. 
However, with a sufficient number of banks restricting its finances, the firm’s perceived risk 
might increase. Hence, if the largest banks restrict debt financing, the cost of debt could be 
impacted (Ansar et al., 2013). Further, the cost of debt will have a greater impact when the 
company is financed by banks in emerging countries, due to a restricted pool of debt in these 
countries. 
Further, a topic of future research could be to investigate the effect of exclusion on the stocks 
that correlate with the excluded stocks. According to the Luo and Balvers (2017) adoption of 
Merton (1987) and Fama and French (2007), the COE of the correlated stocks will also change. 
Hence, it could be of interest to examine whether the COE changes significantly.   
Additionally, exclusion of stocks in other markets, such as in Asia, could be examined using 
a similar research design as presented in our study. 
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10. Appendix  
10.1 Implied Cost of Equity Capital  
We follow prior research (e.g. Hail and Leuz (2006)) and use two implied cost of equity 
measures developed by Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Each model 
presents different versions of the dividend discount model. We average these methods to 
reduce potential forecast bias and measurement error (following e.g. Hail and Leuz (2006)).  
The method developed by Easton (2004) is a modified price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio. 
Equation 6 presents this method. 
Equation 6: The Easton (2004) model 
𝑷𝒕 =
𝒙𝒕+𝟐 + 𝒓 ∗ ?̂?𝒕+𝟏 − 𝒙𝒕+?̂? 
𝒓𝟐
  
This model uses the expected dividend per share (DPS) in period t+1 as well as the one-year- 
and two-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecasts to find the abnormal earnings growth 
(Hail & Leuz, 2006)28.  
Further, Equation 7 shows the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) method. 
Equation 7: The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model 
𝑷𝒕 =
𝒙𝒕+𝟏
𝒓
∗  
𝒈𝒔𝒕 + 𝒓 ∗  
?̂?𝒕+𝟏
𝒙𝒕+?̂?
− 𝒈𝑳𝑻
𝒓 − 𝒈𝑳𝑻
 
This model also uses the expected DPS in period t+1, along with one-year ahead EPS forecasts 
(Hail & Leuz, 2006). Also, the model is dependent on short-term and long-term earnings 
growth. The long-term earnings growth is the expected inflation rate, which equals the one-
year ahead realized monthly country-specific inflation rates. The short-term growth rate is the 
average between the 5-year growth forecasts predicted by analysts and the percentage change 
in earnings from year t+1 and t+2. 
 
28 To get a numerical solution, the model is required to have only positive changes in forecasted EPS. 
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Pt = the firm’s market price at date t 
?̂?𝑡+1, ?̂?𝑡+2= expected future EPS for period t+1 and expected future EPS for period t+2 
?̂?𝑡+1= expected dividend per share for period t+1 
gST, gLT = expected future short-term and long-term growth 
r = implied cost of equity capital 
As presented, these estimates are highly dependent on analysts’ forecasts of future earnings. 
Since many of the tobacco companies in our sample have few or no analyst coverages, our 
results would be biased, and we would lose many observations. 29  
10.2 OLS Assumptions 
The regression models presented in our analyses use the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation. Therefore, the assumptions for OLS must be taken into consideration to determine 
a causal relationship between exclusion and the cost of equity capital. Under assumptions one 
to five (Section 10.2.1 to 10.2.5), the OLS estimator will be the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) and will satisfy the Gauss-Markov Theorem, which justifies the use of OLS rather 
than other estimators (Wooldridge, 2016). However, to interpret the t-statistics and F statistics, 
we present a sixth assumption that must hold (Section 10.2.6). 
The six assumptions presented in this section are called the classical linear model (CLM) 
assumptions for time series (Wooldridge, 2016). 
10.2.1 Linearity  
The linearity assumption defines the multiple linear regression model  (Wooldridge, 2016). 
This assumption states that the regression model is linear in the parameters, i.e. that there is a 
linear relationship between the control variables and the dependent variable. When the 
 
29 The median analyst coverage for the tobacco firms in this sample is seven before the exclusion period and two after the 
exclusion period. In contrast, the median analyst coverage for the coal firms is nine before exclusion and nine after exclusion. 
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linearity assumption is satisfied, a one-unit change in the independent variable will have the 
same effect on the dependent variable, regardless of the independent variable’s starting value.  
This assumption is tested by plotting the model residuals against the fitted values for each 
variable. A difference between the blue line and the dotted line signals a non-linear 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (Paruchuri, 2012). 
As seen, taking the log of BtoM, TotalAssets, and NetIncomeToRevenue improves the 
relationship the tobacco analysis. We applied the same on the coal analysis (not shown) by 
taking the log of BtoM, TotalAssets, NetIncomeToRevenue, and the forecast variables. 
 
Figure 11: Tobacco firms without log 
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Figure 12: Tobacco firms with the use of log 
10.2.2 No perfect collinearity 
The OLS estimation must assume no perfect correlation between the independent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2016). Further, no independent variable can be constant. This assumption must 
hold for the whole sample, i.e. the underlying data. We test the multicollinearity assumption 
for the tobacco and the coal sample. Neither results show sign that multicollinearity is a 
problem. 
Multicollinearity: Tobacco analysis 
In Table 12, the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables (COE included) 
determines if any multicollinearity is present. This table shows that most variables are 
correlated, however, not to such extent that multicollinearity is a problem. The highest 
correlation is between the BtoM variable and the LiabilitiesToTotalAssets variable (-49%).30 
 
30 Excluding one of the variables; BtoM or LiabilitiestoTotalAssets, does not change our results presented in Section 5. 
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Table 12: Pearson correlation coefficients for the tobacco and food sample 
 
Further, Equation 8 presents the VIF function, which examines whether multicollinearity is 
present. 
Equation 8: The VIF function 
𝑽𝑰𝑭 =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝑹𝒊
𝟐 
As seen in Equation 8, the VIF function for an independent variable is obtained using the R-
squared of the regression of all the other independent variables on that exact variable. 
Table 13: The VIF function for the tobacco and food sample 
 
The higher the value presented by the VIF function, the higher the collinearity in between the 
independent variables. As seen in Table 13, the VIF statistics of each independent variable are 
close to 1, which signals no multicollinearity present (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985).31 
Multicollinearity: Coal Analysis 
In the analysis of coal exclusions, ForecastDeviation, ForecastDispersion, ExpectedInflation, 
and TotalEmissionstoTotalRevenues are included in some of the model specifications. Table 
14 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables, along with 
 
31 High values of the VIF function often range from 5 to 10 (Neter et al., 1985). A value of 1 indicates zero correlation with 
other variables. 
COE BtoM TotalAssets LiabilitiestoTotalAssets Volatility Netincometorev
COE 1 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.15 -0.11
BtoM 0.13 1 -0.11 -0.49 0.32 0.11
TotalAssets 0.10 -0.11 1 -0.05 -0.25 0.03
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 0.01 -0.49 -0.05 1 0.09 -0.43
Volatility 0.15 0.32 -0.25 0.09 1 -0.33
Netincometorev -0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.43 -0.33 1
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Volatility 1.546
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 2.335
log(TotalAssets) 1.359
log(BtoM) 2.831
log(Netincometorev) 1.500
VIF Function
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the two COE estimates. Multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem. The VIF function 
presented in Table 15 confirms these findings.  
Table 14: Pearson correlation coefficients for the coal and comparables 
sample 
 
 
Table 15: The VIF function for the coal and comparables sample 
 
10.2.3 Zero conditional mean  
The error term uit must have an expected value of zero and must be uncorrelated with any of 
the  explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2016). For time series, this means that the explanatory 
variables are contemporaneously exogenous. A violation of this assumption would lead to 
endogenous explanatory variables and cause biased estimates. This might be the case when 
omitting important factors that correlate with any of the Xit variables and the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2016).  
The zero conditional mean assumption cannot be tested through a formal test. However, we 
have addressed several endogeneity issues during our analyses by including different variables 
that could have an impact on the COE, and that could be correlated with the explanatory 
COE COEimpliedaverage BtoM TotalAssets LiabilitiestoTotalAssets Volatility Inflationexpected ForecastDeviation ForecastDispersion TotalEmissionstoRevenuesNetIncomeToRevenue
COE 1 0.39 0.19 -0.29 -0.13 0.56 0.02 0.28 0.20 0.14 -0.16
COEimpliedaverage 0.39 1 0.57 -0.22 -0.20 0.50 0.01 0.66 0.15 0.21 -0.23
BtoM 0.19 0.57 1 -0.06 -0.23 0.40 -0.09 0.50 0.002 0.07 -0.19
TotalAssets -0.29 -0.22 -0.06 1 0.19 -0.21 -0.03 -0.18 -0.12 -0.21 0.15
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets -0.13 -0.20 -0.23 0.19 1 -0.08 0.02 -0.20 -0.32 -0.23 -0.13
Volatility 0.56 0.50 0.40 -0.21 -0.08 1 0.14 0.44 0.29 0.03 -0.24
Inflationexpected 0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.14 1 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04
ForecastDeviation 0.28 0.66 0.50 -0.18 -0.20 0.44 0.01 1 0.11 0.14 -0.37
ForecastDispersion 0.20 0.15 0.002 -0.12 -0.32 0.29 0.01 0.11 1 0.03 0.18
TotalEmissionstoRevenues 0.14 0.21 0.07 -0.21 -0.23 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.03 1 -0.10
NetIncomeToRevenue -0.16 -0.23 -0.19 0.15 -0.13 -0.24 0.04 -0.37 0.18 -0.10 1
Correlation Matrix 
log(BtoM) 1.87
log(TotalAssets) 1.33
LiabilitiestoTotalAssets 1.74
Volatility 1.51
log(1 + ForecastDispersion) 1.50
ForecastDeviation 1.42
log(NetIncomeToRevenue) 1.35
TotalEmissionstoRevenues 1.14
VIF Function
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variables (such as new regulations through a variable for net income scaled by revenues and 
different macro factors through a variable for GDP per capita). 
10.2.4 Homoskedasticity  
The error term uit is assumed to be homoscedastic, meaning that the errors have the same 
variance given any value of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2016). When this is 
violated, the model exhibits heteroscedasticity. When analyzing panel data, the variation of 
each unit will likely vary, which may produce heteroskedastic error  (Wooldridge, 2016).  
Test for homoskedasticity 
We use the Breusch-Pagan test on each sample to test the homoskedasticity assumption 
(Torres-Reyna, 2010). The corresponding p-values, as seen in Table 16, are below 0.05 for all 
samples, meaning that heteroskedasticity is present. We control for this by using Newey-West 
robust standard errors. 
Table 16: Breusch-Pagan test for homoskedasticity 
 
10.2.5 No serial correlation  
Serial correlation occurs when the errors in different periods correlate with each other 
(Wooldridge, 2016). Such correlation often occurs in the case of panel data as the same units 
are observed over several years and are not independent of each other. 
The Wooldridge/Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in FE-panels is conducted on each 
data sample, to test whether the data exhibits serial correlation. Table 17 presents the results. 
The tests provide p-values below 0.05 for all samples, meaning that there are problems with 
autocorrelation. This problem is accounted for by robust standard errors as well as the analysis 
on aggregated data presented in Section 7.2.2.  
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
BP 47.566 54.488 165.95
p-value 4.328e-08 5.551e-09 2.2e-16
Breusch-Pagan test
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Table 17: Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation 
 
10.2.6 Normality  
This assumption states that the errors are independent of X and normally distributed 
(Wooldridge, 2016) and must be satisfied to perform statistical inference about the variance 
of the OLS estimator. This assumption can be studied through a Q-Q plot.   
The Q-Q plots of the residuals presented in Figure 13 show that the distributions seem to 
follow normality. Some deviation is expected with such small sample and high variation. 
 
Figure 13: Q-Q plots 
10.3 Testing for Cross-Sectional Dependence 
The Pesaran CD and the Breusch-Pagan LM tests for cross-sectional dependence across errors 
are conducted for each sample  (Torres-Reyna, 2010). Table 18 and Table 19 provide the 
results. The tests reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence. Therefore, it is 
essential to cluster the standard errors at the cross-sectional level (firm).  
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
chisq 94.794 61.96 44.106
p-value 2.2e-16 3.506e-15 3.111e-11
Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in 
panel models
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Table 18: Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional dependence 
  
Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional dependence in 
panels 
 Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis 
  Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE 
chisq 1119.4 2409.1 2035.8 
p-value 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 
 
Table 19: Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence 
  Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis 
  Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE 
z -3.6447 -1.6144 -0.77058 
p-value 0.0002677 0.106532 0.44133 
 
10.4 Correcting for Outliers 
Figure 14 presents potential outliers in the cost of equity estimations. The left figure of the 
coal and comparables sample shows the outliers using the Bloomberg estimates of COE, 
whereas the right figure shows the outliers using the implied COE estimates. Those 
observations outside the fences of the boxplots are defined as outliers and are removed.  
 
32 Even though this p-value is above 5%, the corresponding p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test suggests cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. 
33 Even though this p-value is above 5%, the corresponding p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test suggests cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. 
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Figure 14: Potential outliers 
10.5 Comparing Pooled OLS, Random effects and Fixed 
effects 
To choose the best model, we perform several tests on the data.  
FE vs. POLS 
We use the F-test to determine whether the FE model or the POLS model is the most efficient 
(Torres-Reyna, 2010). The tests shown in Table 20 provide p-values below 0.05 for all 
samples, indicating that FE is the most efficient model. 
Table 20: F-test: FE vs. POLS 
 
FE vs. RE 
The Hausman test for panel models tests whether the Random Effects (RE) model or the FE 
model is preferred (Torres-Reyna, 2010). Table 21 provides the results. The p-values are 
smaller than 0.05 for all samples, indicating that the FE model is the preferred model.  
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
F 7.2263 11.063 8.5416
p-value 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16
F-test for twoways effects
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Table 21: Hausman test: FE vs. RE 
 
10.6 Testing for Two-Ways Effect 
We use the build-in PLM-test in R for two-ways effects to test whether or not to control for 
year fixed effects (Torres-Reyna, 2010). Table 22 provides the results. With p-values below 
0.05 for all samples, we can reject the null hypothesis of no significant effects by including 
yearly fixed effects. Thus, our models should include year fixed effects.  
Table 22: PLM-test: Two-ways fixed effects 
 
When using the aggregated data in Section 7.1.2, we get a p-value above 0.05, meaning that 
there is no need to include year fixed effects. 
10.7 T-test of Parallel Trends Assumption 
Table 23: T-test of differences between slopes 
 
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
chisq 16.032 13.773 22.788
p-value 0.006755 0.01712 0.003648
Hausman Test
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
chisq 150.59 1034.3 647.39
p-value 2.2e-16 2.2e-16 2.2e-16
Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (Breusch-Pagan) for 
unbalanced panels
Tobacco Analysis Coal Analysis Coal Analysis
Bloomberg COE Bloomberg COE Implied COE
T 0.0134 0.3032 0.2863
p-value 0.9897 0.7686 0.7811
T-test of differences in slopes
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10.8 Other “Sin” Industries not Analyzed 
We choose the tobacco industry for this study, mainly due to the tobacco companies’ long 
history of being classified as “sin”, their overall health concerns, and their inability to reform 
their businesses without changing their industry specification. However, alcohol, gaming, and 
weaponry are also popular stocks to exclude (Luo & Balvers, 2017). 
We do not introduce weapon stocks because of the classification process. It is challenging to 
classify defense stocks since most companies in the industry also build commercial passenger 
airplanes (e.g. (Fabozzi, Ma, & Oliphant, 2008; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009)). Further, it is not 
clear how investors define defense. Additionally, we do not introduce gaming and alcohol 
stocks because of their ability to reform, and because exclusions of these companies are not 
as common. According to Luo and Balvers (2017), gaming has become more acceptable in the 
US in recent years, explained by a wave of legalization of casino gaming in the US and a 
significant reduction of gaming screens made by socially responsible investors. 
